Perceptual sensitivity and non-human nature: a virtue ethics of the environment

In this paper, I employ John McDowell's ethical writings in order to navigate a discussion that arises from criticisms of Paul Taylor's theory of 'respect for nature.' I begin by discussing Taylor's argument for 'respect for nature' and the biocentric outlook, giving special emphasis to his explanation of how an agent can come to embody such an attitude. 1 then raise criticisms against Taylor's account drawing, in part, from the work of Rosalind Hursthouse. First, that Taylor's account of how the attitude of 'respect for nature' can be adopted by an agent is insufficient for the kind of transformation that is necessary for an agent to live up to its prescriptions. Second, that Taylor's concept of 'inherent worth' is dubious and is rendered superfluous by a virtue ethical approach. Finally, I raise the objection that Taylor's theory, in its emphasis on moral deliberation, creates a problem with the urgency and fluidity of real world ethical decision making. In evaluating Hursthouse's critique I come to the conclusion that the problems that arise are problems that arise as a result of the limits of a strictly deontological approach. Thus, I will apply an alternative virtue ethical approach by reconstructing John McDowell's complicated and nuanced meta-ethics and virtue ethics. McDowell's ethical conceptualism provides a way of understanding how an agent can be trained to respond to a situation rationally without deliberation. It also accounts for the radical and transformative training that is required for an agent's action to accord with her perception of the morally salient features of the world. Most interestingly, I use McDowell to articulate a view in which the world draws upon our value concepts. In this picture we experience the involuntary actualization of our value concepts via our affective sensibility.