Hearts and minds: the population-centric approach to counterinsurgency

The 'hearts and minds' counterinsurgency doctrine has emerged as the model for American warfare in the future. The current narrative is that General David Petraeus, armed with this new doctrine, was able to turn the failing Iraq war around, and provide the country with the overall stability needed for peace and security. The purpose o f this thesis is to examine the war in Iraq and demonstrate that the precipitous drop in violence experienced in 2007 was not a direct result o f the implementation o f the 'hearts and minds' doctrine. Using accounts from individuals who have been involved in the war, this thesis argues that the precipitous drop in violence by late summer 2007 in Iraq was the result of the interaction between the A1 Anbar Awakening, the cessation of sectarian cleansing and the surge. These findings are important because they show that the 'hearts and minds' approach to counterinsurgency is not the as effective as commonly thought. Wars o f nation building cannot be won simply with the application of the right counterinsurgency doctrine. If policy makers in Washington, D.C. believe the simplistic idea that the United States can just intervene militarily and rebuild entire countries if the doctrine is right, then the United States will be set on a path o f perpetual war.