On deriving principles within a moral pluralistic framework

The primary function of this paper is to introduce a prototypical system for principle derivation within a moral pluralist framework in environmental ethics. In order to achieve this, I will first introduce the debate between moral monism and moral pluralism. I will advance two prima facie reasons which are intended to cast doubt on the merits of moral monism in environmental ethics and set the table for a discussion of the moral pluralistic alternative. Following this, I will explain some of the perennial problems moral pluralism faces. I will articulate each problem into a specific criterion that will guide us assessing the system that I will endorse. My system of principle derivation will involve two "domains" that are intended to assess how we derive moral principles at two different substages. Once I have made my view on how we should begin to derive principles within a pluralistic framework clear, I conclude with a discussion regarding how my system answers to the previously established desiderata. If I succeed in doing this, my hope is that my sketch of a system of principle derivation will contribute to the moral pluralism movement\ in environmental ethics.