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dc.contributor.author Tadjvar, Nawab
dc.date.accessioned 2019-10-09T23:15:16Z
dc.date.available 2019-10-09T23:15:16Z
dc.date.issued 2018
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10211.3/213707
dc.description.abstract In part 11 of the Ethics, Spinoza delineates three types of knowledge central to his epistemology. In order of ascending superiority Spinoza’s reveals these to include knowledge from opinion or imagination, rational knowledge, and intuitive knowledge. Spinoza’s treatment of the types of knowledge is sparse which has led to interpretive disagreements amongst scholarship. Most scholars agree that all three types of knowledge differ with respect to their method of cognition often referred to as “form”, however there is considerable disagreement as to whether rational and intuitive knowledge also differ with respect to epistemic content. While some scholars argue that the content of rational knowledge is identical to that of intuitive knowledge, others argue there is a new domain of substantial information accessible to intuitive knowledge. Steven Nadler suggests that such a gap in content between reason and intuition would certainly make Spinoza something of a mystic. No such gap in content exists on Nadler’s account however, maintaining that Spinoza is “a rationalist through and through”. Nadler’s argument places the disparity between reason and intuition on a distinction between modes of cognition, rather than content, which he contends disqualifies Spinoza as a mystic. Instead, Nadler characterizes Spinoza as a rationalist on the grounds that reasoning has access to the complete domain of substantial epistemic content. In this paper I argue that Nadler places the crux of mysticism too narrowly in content and he neglects the more important features of the mystics epistemology, especially those that are related to ontology. I hold that when we consider Spinoza’s epistemology and ontology, as delineated in the Ethics, it becomes clear that Spinoza meets the muster for qualification as a mystic, even though his project is unique nonetheless by means of the rational method he employs to achieve the mystical experience. While Nadler’s argument leaves no room for the possibility that Spinoza could qualify as both a rationalist and a mystic, I argue Spinoza is just the rationally inclined mystic. en_US
dc.format.extent v, 34 leaves en_US
dc.language.iso en_US en_US
dc.publisher San Francisco State University en_US
dc.rights Copyright by Nawab Tadjvar, 2018 en_US
dc.source AS36 2018 PHIL .T33
dc.title Spinoza : the rationally inclined mystic en_US
dc.type Thesis en_US
dc.contributor.department Philosophy en_US
dc.description.degree Philosophy

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