On the synthesis of Kantian intuitions in debates about nonconceptual content

I argue that for Kant, human intuitions are necessarily synthetically structured. Moreover, I suggest that contemporary philosophy of mind can return to Kant for insight. I introduce two contemporary debates about nonconceptual content, an important difference between intuitions and sensations, and a recent interpretation of Kant's take on human intuitions. I present two textual arguments against this interpretation, which I call the reductio and the razor, and further ground them by suggesting a counterfactual reading of Kant's Critique. I evaluate two plausible lines of thought: that, for Kant, nonconceptual content is either a matter of the type of synthesis Kant takes as forming the representation, and a difference between what he calls 'intellectual' and 'figurative' syntheses, or is, instead, a difference between intuitions and sensations. I conclude connecting these claims into a wider look at how Kant's philosophy might be insightful today.