Masters Thesis

The secret joke of Greene's fork

Most of people's everyday judgments are inspired by emotions. Rarely do people rely on their cognitive resources to judge a situation rationally. Can the same be said of people in moral situations? If so, what is the relationship between people's psychological patterns and moral judgments? Contrary to historical stereotypes, research in moral psychology shows deontological judgments are mostly driven by emotions while consequentialist judgments are mostly driven by cognition. Joshua Greene argues that these latter claims are manifestations of two dissociable psychological processes, which is a strong metaphysical claim. If the metaphysical expectation is true, the implications may be philosophically groundbreaking, for it could cast doubt on the normative status of a particular moral theory and, at the same time, elevate the status of another. Before seriously considering the implications, I reexamine the evidence gathered and theoretical commitments used to ambitiously motivate the strong metaphysical claim. In doing so, I undercut Greene's metaphysical claim by arguing for the opposite set of claims, namely, that deontological judgments can be driven by cognition and that consequentialist judgments can be driven by emotions. Keywords: deontological judgment; consequentialist judgment; emotion; cognition, moral psychology

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