

Nationalism and the Development of Archaeology in Iran

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by  
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
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
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## Nationalism and Development of Archaeology in Iran

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San Francisco, California  
2019

In the last few decades, archaeologists have become concerned with the relationship between nationalism and archaeology. Promoting nationalism needs the remote past (Kohl 1998: 223). This paper looks at the relationship between nationalism, politics, and the development and practice of archaeology in Iran from the late nineteenth century to the present time. The use of archaeology for political aims in France, Nazi Germany, Spain, Turkey, Iraq, and Israel will be reviewed in order to understand the role of archaeology in nation-building. It is argued that despite changes in power within Iran, Iranian archaeology has not experienced much transformation during the last 150 years. The results of this study indicate that, with the exception of the Qajar period (1787-1925), Iranian archaeology has always been a political tool rather than a professional discipline.

I certify that the Abstract is a correct representation of the content of this thesis.

  
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## CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this study is to examine the history of political modernization of Iran, specifically detailing the interactions of nationalism and archaeology during this time.

This research project is comprised of three main sections: (1) defining nation and nationalism, (2) the relationship between nationalism and archaeology in different countries, and (3) reviewing the history of nationalism and the development of archaeology in Iran from the late eighteenth century onwards. In order to discuss and analyze these concepts, I conducted a literature search.

The focus of the first chapter will be on nationalism. In order to have a clearer understanding of this concept, I will first define the term “nation” by discussing both objective and subjective definitions of this term. I will also explain the two overlapping concepts of nation: civic or territorial, and ethnic or genealogical. Following this discussion, I will review the concept of nationalism by examining its definition from different perspectives, from its early arrival in late eighteenth century Europe to its role in nation-building and cartographic influence.

For this section, I will use texts from both anthropological and archaeological sources to define “nation” and “nationalism”. Some of my primary sources for this chapter are *Nationalism and Modernism* (1998), *Nationalism* (2001), and *The Antiquity of Nations* (2004) all authored by the British historical sociologist, Anthony D. Smith (1939-2016), *Imagined Communities* (1983) by the political scientist and historian,

Benedict Anderson (1936-2015), and *Marxism and the National and Colonial Question* (1976) written by the leader of the Soviet Union from the mid-1920s to 1953, Josef V. Stalin (1878-1953). In these books, each author defines nation and nationalism from a different perspective and reviews the roots and origin of nationalism.

The second chapter of this study will focus on the relationship between archaeology and nationalism. In this chapter, I will discuss how archaeological data has been used, manipulated, and misinterpreted for nationalistic purposes. In this regard, it is necessary to learn about the three different approaches of archaeology: culture-history, processualism, and post-processualism. *Nationalism and Archaeology: On the Constructions of Nations and the Reconstructions of the Remote Past* (1998) by Philip L. Kohl, *Archaeology Under Fire: Nationalism, Politics and Heritage in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East* (1998) by Lynn Meskell, *Alternative Archaeologies: Nationalist, Colonialist, Imperialist* (1984), and *Romanticism, Nationalism, and Archaeology* (1995) by Bruce G. Trigger are my primary sources in this chapter. Following this discussion, I will highlight the development of archaeology in different regions – from France, Germany, and Spain in Europe to Turkey, Iraq, and Israel in the Middle East – to understand the relationship of archaeology and nationalism in nation-building during the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Following these case studies, the role of nationalism in the establishment of museums, the complications of a nationalistic interpretation of material culture, and finally, the professional and ethical role of archaeologists in this context will be discussed.

In the final chapter, I will review the emergence of nationalism and archaeology in Iran. Both concepts were imported to Iran; nationalism was first brought to Iran by the Western-educated Iranian elites during the nineteenth century (Abdi 2001: 52), while archaeology was introduced by British and Russian officers during the early 1840s (2001: 53). This chapter will contain three important sections: (1) the history and emergence of nationalism in Iran in the nineteenth century, (2) the history of the practice of archaeology in Iran under the Qajar dynasty (1787-1925), Pahlavi dynasty (1925-1979), and the Islamic Republic of Iran (1979-present), and (3) the influence of archaeology and nationalism on each other, especially during the mid-twentieth century.

Some of my primary sources discussing the history of nationalism in Iran will include history books written by renowned Iranian historians. *Iran Between the Revolutions* (1982) by Ervand Abrahamian, *Iran: A Modern History* (2017) by Abbas Amanat, *Negahi be Shah [The Shah]* (2013) by Abbas Milani, and *The Reign of The Ayatollahs* (1984) by Shaul Bakhash are some examples.

To investigate the history of archaeology in Iran, I used *Nationalism, Politics, and the Development of Archaeology in Iran* (2001) by Kamyar Abdi, *All Our Findings Are Under Their Boots! The Monologue of Violence in Iranian Archaeology* (2015) by Maryam Dezhamkhooy, *Bastanshenasi Iran az 1850 ta 1975 [Archaeology in Iran from 1850 to 1975]* (1976) by Gholam Reza Ma'soumi, and *Archaeology and the Iranian National Museum: Qajar and Early Pahlavi Cultural Politics* (2014) by Nader Nasiri-Moghadam, among other sources. In addition to these sources, I have also used primary

sources written by Iranian and foreign archaeologists who practiced archaeology in Iran from the mid-nineteenth century to the present.

The main argument of this study is that despite changes in power, Iranian archaeology has not experienced many transformations during the last 150 years because it has always been ruled by a dictatorial regime. In this regard, I will review the practice of archaeology in Iran and the way nationalism and archaeology influenced one other – especially in the mid-twentieth century. I anticipate that this research will demonstrate that nationalism in Iran has led to the political manipulation of archaeological evidence and material remains.

Literature for this review will be chosen based on online search functions or through San Francisco State University library system. I will also incorporate material from edited texts from the library along with books from my own personal collection. As mentioned, this paper is based on literature research. Accessing detailed archaeological data in Iran is limited. Future investigations based on interviews and field research are needed to enhance our knowledge about the state of archaeology in Iran.

## CHAPTER 2 – Nation and Nationalism

In this chapter, I will review the concept of nationalism by looking at its definitions from different perspectives, by summarizing its historical overview, and by discussing the role of nationalism in nation-building which first emerged in Europe in the late eighteenth century and early nineteenth century. To have a better understanding of nationalism, I will first define “nation.” In this regard, I will follow Anthony D. Smith’s definition and perspective on nation. Smith argues that definitions of a nation can stress “objective” or “subjective” factors (2001: 10). Joseph Stalin’s (1976) definition of nation in his book *Marxism and the National and Colonial Question*, is an example that focuses on objective factors such as language and religion. On the other hand, Benedict Anderson (2016), in his book *Imagined Communities*, gives us a more “subjective” definition of a nation by stressing on subjective factors such as attitude and sentiments. I will also explain the two overlapping concepts of the nation: civic or territorial, and ethnic or genealogical, and finally the role of nationalism in shaping maps and defining homelands.

### **What is Nationalism?**

Nationalism is the complicated ideology of shared identification of a nation, which has been used for political rights and purposes of a nation as a whole (Abdi 2001: 51). It is a relatively modern phenomenon, a political imagination, which first emerged in Europe in the late eighteenth century and early nineteenth century, but is now present

everywhere in the world (Spencer et al. 1990: 283). From a nationalistic point of view, the nation is the basis of political sovereignty and that political sovereignty is the right of the nation (Poole 1999: 9). Nationalism is an ideological movement for creating and protecting “the autonomy, unity, and identity of an existing or potential nation” (Smith 2001: 183). But what is a nation? To understand nationalism, it is necessary to define what a nation is first.

### Nations before Nationalism

Defining “nation” might sound like an easy task, but Smith believes that perhaps defining a nation is the most problematic job in the study of nationalism (2001: 10). He continues that definitions of the word nation can range from those focusing on “objective” factors such as language, religion, territory, and institutions, to those that stress “subjective” factors: attitudes, perceptions, and sentiments (2001: 11). Joseph Stalin defines a nation by stressing on objective factors: “A nation is a historically constituted, stable community of people, formed by a common language, territory, economic life, and psychological make-up manifested in a common culture” (1976: 61). Smith argues that as Max Weber (1948) explains, the problem with objective criteria of the nation is that it always excludes some nations (2001: 11).

On the other hand, Benedict Anderson (2016), in his book *Imagined Communities*, with an anthropological perspective gives us a more subjective definition of a nation: “It is an imagined political community- and imagined as both inherently

limited and sovereign” (2016: 6). Anderson explains that a nation is imagined because it is not possible for people of a nation to know, meet, or hear from all the fellow members of their nation, but they imagine their communication. It is limited because all nations, even the largest ones, are finite. A nation is sovereign because it came to maturity at a stage of human history when Enlightenment and Revolution were taking down the legitimacy of the hierarchical dynastic realm (2016: 7). Finally, a nation is imagined as a community because “regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship” (Anderson 2016: 7). Subjective definitions are in contrast with objective definitions. Focusing on sentiment, will, imagination, and perception as standards of nations makes it difficult to separate a nation from other collectivity like regions, tribes, or cities, which may have similar subjective attachments (Smith 2001: 11). However, Poole believes that this imagination will not construct an object of consciousness, but forms a conception of ourselves as existing in relation to that object, and a form of self-consciousness; because members of a nation can recognize each other and themselves through the nation (Poole 1999: 12). Perhaps the best way to define a nation is to consider both subjective and objective definitions (Smith 2001: 11).

A nation is neither a state nor an ethnic group. It is not a state, because states are independent institutions that are different from other institutions, with the legal monopoly of enforcement and extraction in one territory. Nations are living communities in which the members have a common homeland and culture (Smith 2001: 12). Nation and ethnic

community have some overlaps because they are both derived from the same phenomena: collective cultural identities; but because an ethnic community does not have a political structure, usually lacks a public culture, and does not necessarily need a physical territory, it cannot be a nation. If a nation wants to be recognized as a nation, it must have a homeland for a long time and needs to develop a public culture (Smith 2001: 12).

Because nationalism is a modern ideology, “the idea that creates nations assumes not only that there were no nations before nationalism, but that there can be no pre-nationalist nations” (Smith 2001: 93). The important argument is the fact that nation is an old term (Calhoun 1997: 9), which was employed before the concept of nationalism (Diaz-Andreu 1995: 40). Meanings of nation before nationalism had no connection with the modern, nationalism-dependent meanings of this term (Smith 2001: 83).

Nation has a Latin origin from the word *natio* meaning birth, or something physically born (Diaz-Andreu 1995: 40; Greenfeld 2016: 11). Before the modern era and during the Middle Ages, the meaning of nation was broader and referred to people who were linked together based on their place of birth, place of their residency, shared cultural traits, and in some cases it was used to refer to individuals who were members of the same political unit; it was not about grouping people nor did it relate to political connotations (Diaz-Andreu 1995: 40, Calhoun 1997: 9).

In Rome for instance, the term nation was used to classify humans and it referred to foreigners who lived in Rome but were not citizens. Later, when Latin was used in the Middle Ages as the language of learning, *natio* became the term for foreign status. First,

it was applied to students who were assigned to a professor to supervise their studies, and by considering the routes which they came from, the university community was divided into different nations and was named after these routes. Later, by living and learning together, these nations became communities of opinion (Greenfeld 2016: 11). In this regard, the term gradually was used for exclusive, small, and exceptionally high-ranking individuals and the cultural and political elites (2016: 11).

In England, during the late fifteenth and early sixteenth century, the concept of the nation as an inclusive, sovereign community emerged. The new definition of nation consisted of the membership unaffected by class and status classifications, and as a “natural object of the member’s loyalty and commitment” (Greenfeld 2016: 11). Greenfeld argues that as a result of this shifting, the nation became a synonym of the term “people” (2016: 11).

Today, a nation is a community with a name, history, culture, territory, economy, educational system, and legal rights. For nationalists and their followers, this could be an ideal definition. The nation is not a “one-for-all” or “all-or-nothing” concept; formation of nations is an ongoing process, sometimes being fast and other times slow. As Smith explains, in most European countries, this process has been going on from the medieval period, and in some other parts of the world, it has been more recent (Smith 2004: 183). In the following chapter, I will review the formation of nation-states in Europe and the Middle East during the eighteenth, nineteenth, and (in some cases) twentieth centuries.

### **Overlapping Concept of the Nation: Civic or Territorial, and Ethnic or Genealogical**

Smith argues that in defining the term nation, we need to understand two overlapping concepts of nation: civic or territorial, and ethnic or genealogical. The civic or territorial conception sees a nation as a unit of people with a territory, a common economy with “a single territory-wide occupational and production system” (Smith 2004: 41), shared laws and legal rights and duties for everyone, a public education system, with one single civic ideology. Based on this definition, a nation is formed by territory, economy, law, and education, which are all Western concepts (2004: 41).

On the other hand, the ethnic or genealogy concept is less related to Western modernity. Based on this view, a nation has a name, with common ancestry, national solidarity, shared culture, and customs with the same shared history. The fundamental concepts of this definition are genealogy, demography, traditional culture, and history (Smith 2004: 41). Smith argues that the ethnic conception is more acceptable outside the West and sometimes is in contrast with the civic conception (2004: 42).

Diaz-Andreu also argues that civic or territorial nationalism predominated from 1789 to the 1870s, and ethnic or genealogical nationalism became paramount after 1870s (2001: 430). Based on Diaz-Andreu’s study, the civic or territorial nationalism arose after the French Revolution of 1789 and was related to the concept of utility (Diaz-Andreu 2001: 432). The author argues that this kind of nationalism led to the idea that only large states could be considered as nations which were limited to locations in America and a few places in Western Europe including France, Great Britain, Spain, and Denmark

(2001: 432). It was in these countries that the importance of learning the wisdom from the past started to grow and led to the emergence of professional archaeology and the opening of museums (2001: 432). Diaz-Andre believes that “the success of civic nationalism led to the institutionalization of archaeology” (2001: 432).

The central principle of civic nationalism which only considered large states as nations, gave the idea to some of the elites and nationalists from potentially large nations to create new nation-states (Diaz-Andreu 2001: 435). The unification of Italy and Germany in 1870 and 1871 is the example of these nation-states. Based on this new idea “the existence of a nation could induce the creation of a new state” (Diaz-Andreu 2001: 435). This nationalism is called ethnic nationalism which is based on the belief in the existence of a common ancestor and shared culture. The author believes that in this context history and archaeology had a crucial and legitimating role in justifying the common characteristics of an ethnic nation (2001: 435).

Diaz-Andreu believes that from the 1870s the use of archaeology for nationalistic and political aims significantly increased and archaeology became a pivotal discipline to provide information in the studies of a past for ethnonational groups (2001: 437). In the following chapter, the relationship between archaeology and politics will be reviewed.

### **History of Nationalism**

The history of nationalism started during the last quarter of the eighteenth century with patriotic movements and Revolutions in Western Europe as opposition to

monarchical rule (Kohl et al. 2007: 22, Smith 2001: 88). The English Civil War (1642-1651), Latin American independence movement (late eighteenth century and early nineteenth century), French Revolution (1789-1799), and Romanticism (toward the end of the eighteenth century) in Europe are some of the first examples of modern nationalism (Calhoun 1997: 9).

“Nation” became a political term during the French Revolution of 1789 and was associated with the concept of national sovereignty and referred to as “a union of individuals governed by one law and represented by the same law-giving assembly” (Diaz-Andreu 1995: 40). As we can see, this political definition of a nation did not consider the cultural origin.

In the middle of the nineteenth century the politically based definition of nationalism was replaced by a cultural or ethno-nationalism definition which was supporting these ideas: 1) the world is naturally divided into different cultures, 2) every person naturally belongs to a nation, 3) ideally, these cultures should be political units, and 4) each nation should govern itself and take care of its existence (Diaz-Andreu 1995: 40, Smith 2004: 33, Spencer et al. 1990: 283). “This essentialist interpretation of the nation [...] gave history an importance previously unknown” (Diaz-Andreu 1995: 40). Diaz Andreu explains that based on this new definition, it became necessary for nations to justify their origin and formation from the earliest times (1995: 40).

Nationalism is a cultural production, a mode of cultural self-consciousness, a political imagination, and a political principle (Anderson 2016: 4, Poole 1999: 9, Spencer

et al. 1990: 283). Ernest Gellner suggests that “nationalism ... holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent” (1983: 5). However, Craig Calhoun argues that limiting nationalism to a political doctrine as Gellner did will also limit our understanding of this concept because nationalism is not only a doctrine, but a way of thinking, talking, and acting (1997: 11). Calhoun claims that nationalism and national identity do not only shape our political identity, but they influence many aspects of our lives. For example, sometimes the nationalism of soccer fans has political implications, but this does not mean that nationalism of soccer fans has only political sources (1997: 11). Calhoun believes that this aspect of nationalism in our everyday lives gives “nationalism part of its political power” (1997: 12). Nationalism can cause problems or be misleading, but it is hard to say nationalism is wrong or right (1997: 12).

### **Nationalism and Mapping**

Nationalism has played an undeniable and enormous role in modern history. World maps and the effort to draw and redraw them to show the borders between nation-states is one good example (Poole 1999, 9). Nationalism had crushed and changed “the various localisms of region, dialect, custom, and clan” (Smith 1998: 1) and has helped to create powerful nation-states.

Every nation claims to have its homeland, the one that has been described in the literature and celebrated in art and music. Homeland is not just about the physical geography but has a personality and a moral character. The land is believed to be a shared

possession among all members of the nation (Poole 1999: 16). History is another common cause among nations. Every nation has a story of victories, tragedies, and betrayals. Stories of heroic acts or those who sacrificed their lives on behalf of the nation, deaths, battles, defeats, and destructions all play a role in writing this history. The history, the stories, and the projects to learn about them are part of self-consciousness and an attempt to define the national identity “in terms of the activity of the common people, rather than of ruling elites” (1999: 17).

As discussed in this chapter, nation is an old term and was used before the concept of nationalism (Calhoun 1997: 9). Defining the term nation is problematic. Anthony Smith suggests that the best way to define a nation is to consider both objective and subjective factors (2001: 11). During the French Revolution of 1789, nation became a political term and later in the middle of the nineteenth century; nationalism received a more cultural dimension. Based on this new idea, nationalists believed that naturally the world is divided into different nations and each nation is responsible for supporting its existence (Diaz-Andreu 1995: 40). Following the wave of revolutions in Europe, emerging nationalist intellectuals started using the claim of Aboriginality, and “length of possession of a specific territory replaced length of history as the source of national pride” (Sommer 2017: 169).

Nationalism is a cultural production and a political principle (Spencer et al. 1990: 283). Today, nation refers to a community with a name, history, culture, territory, economy, educational system, and legal rights, which is an ideal definition for

nationalists (Smith 2004: 183). If nationalists and politicians want to construct a nation, they need to expand a real or invented remote past, and archaeology is the discipline that can find the required material and data for this means (Kohl 1998: 223). Following the French Revolution of 1789, the modern nations were created, and with the spread of literacy and education, national histories were published in “books, museums, art, and primary educations” (Sommer 2017: 171). Sommer argues that the creation of national history was usually a highly political matter, and “specific ancestors were often linked with specific political parties” (2017: 171). These modern nation states and especially those which were fighting for national independence tried to construct a national past to support their claims. In this regard, archaeological findings were used to show past greatness (2017: 181).

As a result of the development of national identity and state formation in Europe and other places, archaeology became a discipline (Meskell 2002: 282). According to Ian Hodder argument (1982), Sommer argues that since then, material culture has been “actively and consciously used to reproduce, manipulate or challenge social relations” (2017: 182).

In the next chapter, I will review the relationship between nationalism and archaeology to understand how archaeological data has been manipulated for nationalistic purposes and how nationalism has influenced the development of archaeology during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century in different parts of the world.

### CHAPTER 3 –Nationalism and Archaeology

A real or invented remote past can help nationalists to achieve their goals (Kohl 1998: 223). This chapter will discuss how archaeological data has been manipulated and misinterpreted for political and nationalistic purposes. First, the relationship between politics and archaeology will be discussed. In this discussion, three different approaches of archaeology; culture-history, processualism, and post-processualism will be examined. Then, the development of archaeology in different parts of the world from European nations such as Germany, France, Spain, to Turkey, Iraq, and Israel the Middle East will be reviewed to understand the relationship of archaeology and nationalism in nation-building during the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The establishments of archaeological museums and the way they helped nationalism, the problems of nationalistic interpretation of material culture, and finally the professional and ethical role of archaeologists in this context will be discussed.

#### **Archaeology and Politics**

The historiography of archaeology has been reviewed and analyzed mostly by an internalist perspective (Diaz-Andreu 2001: 229). Diaz-Andreu argues that in these reviews, most authors pay less attention or ignore the political role of archaeology. These authors discuss the relationship between archaeology and politics only in extreme situations. For example, when archaeology was used by totalitarian powers such as National Socialist Germany and Fascist Italy, and claim that it is not necessary to

consider these extreme cases to understand how archaeology has developed to become a discipline (2001: 229).

Kohl and Fawcett (1995) claim that “nearly every practicing archaeologist is aware of this inherent relationship between nationalism and archaeology” (Kohl and Fawcett 1995: 14). Kohl and Fawcett also argue that the lack of attention to the relationship between archaeology and nationalism during the pre-processualism era, might be related to the nature of traditional culture-historical research, especially in North America and Europe (1995: 14).

### **Culture-history Approach**

Culture-history is considered to be the leading archaeological theory of the twentieth century before processualism (the 1960s) and post-processualism (1980s), at least among European and American archaeologists (Webster 2009: 11). Under the force of nationalism, the primary focus of archaeology shifted from evolution to interpretation of archaeological remains as the history of certain groups of people. This was the beginning of culture-historical archaeology (Trigger 1995: 269).

The sentiment of culture-history archaeology was its idea that human societies can be divided into different, distinct cultures and it was argued that each archaeological culture is “the manifestation in material terms of a specific people” (Renfrew and Bahn 2012: 464, Trigger 1995: 269). These traditional explanations were focused on diffusion

and migration and assumed that any changes in one group are the result of the influence of a neighboring and a superior group (2012: 463).

It would be an exaggeration to claim archaeologists have totally ignored the relationship between nationalism and archaeology (Diaz-Andreu and Champion 1996: 2). Many archaeologists have analyzed the case of Nazi Germany and Italian fascists (1996: 2). However, Diaz-Andreu and Champion argue that the relationship between nationalism and archaeology has been more fundamental and most of the authors did not provide us with the complete account of this relationship (1996: 3). On the other hand, on another account, Diaz-Andreu (1995) argues that the nationalistic use of archaeology during the Second World War made archaeologists to systematically deny the political role of archaeology (Diaz-Andreu 1995: 39). Even V. Gordon Childe, a prominent supporter of culture-history archaeology, moved away from this approach mostly because of the way archaeological data were used to support Nazi Germany's racist and fascist policies (Diaz-Andreu 1995: 39, Kohl and Fawcett 1995: 14). In this regard, Childe argues that historians and archaeologists must consider archaeology as a science and encouraged them to base their "judgments on the facts unbiased by personal feelings" (Childe 1941: 2).

### **Processual Approach**

In the 1960s, the processual approach began and tried to "isolate the different processes at work within a society" (Renfrew and Bahn 2012: 492). In this new approach,

the focus of archaeologists was to find the causes of changes in one group based on “humanity’s relationship with its environment, [...] economy, and other processes at work within a society to explain why a society was how it was” (Renfrew and Bahn 2012: 492). Kohl also explains that processual archaeology was viewed as a scientific way of studying archaeology, and it aimed to free archaeological interpretations from personal influences which were used in cultural-historical theory (1995: 15). Most of the processual archaeologists believed that “science should not be influenced by ideology” (Kohl and Fawcett 1995: 15) and as a result of this idea, ignored the subjectivity of scholars and the political, economic, and social aspects of societies which led to the ignorance of political notion of archaeology (1995: 15).

### **Post-processual Approach**

The crucial link between archaeology and its social, political, and economic context became known during the 1980s when archeologists such as Trigger and Hodder argued that all kinds of archaeology (culture history, processual, and post-processual) “must be understood within a social, political, cultural, and economic context” (Kohl and Fawcett 1995: 15). During the 1980s, the studies about archaeology and its socio-political context began and among these studies, some of them directly or indirectly addressed the link between archaeology and nationalism (Diaz-Andreu 1995: 39, Kohl and Fawcett 1995: 15)

In the 1980s, the rise of post-processual archaeology (Hodder and Hutson 2003: 206) and rejection of the total objectivity in the research, gave more credit to archaeologists to interpret the material remains based on their perspectives (Kohl 1998: 225). Post-processual archaeology supports the idea that “because every decoding of a message is another encoding, all truth is subjective” (Trigger 1995: 263). Kohl continues that this new approach emphasizes “the subjective interests/perspectives of scholars and the political contexts in which archaeological research is conducted” (Kohl 1998: 225). Since archaeologists started to bring in their personal opinions to the field, archaeology has been involved in contemporary debates such as Marxist, feminist, and indigenous discussions (Meskell 2002: 280).

Trigger argues that in shaping the archaeological thoughts, both internal and external factors must be considered (1995: 263). He continues that archaeologists must be aware of political, economic, and intellectual factors of their work environment, and should adapt to these factors. For example, the political condition of a region/county might formally or informally dictate archaeologists what to say about their archaeological data (1995: 265). On the other hand, internal factors are as influential in interpreting material remains and the past as the external ones. For example, everything that archaeologists believe they know about the past or methods that they use to recover, analyze, and interpret archaeological remains (1995: 265). Trigger concludes that internal perspectives and external conditions have influenced archaeology in complicated ways;

which can ensure us that “the development of archaeology does not occur in a unilinear fashion” (Trigger 1995: 266).

Today, many archaeologists believe that it is impossible to study the emergence and development of new perspectives, theories, and hypothesis in archaeology without considering “their contextualization within the contemporary socio-political framework” (Diaz-Andreu 2001: 229) and as Silberman (1995) strongly asserts, “archaeology may always be an unavoidable political enterprise” (Kohl and Fawcett 1995: 5). Many different political forces have used and affected archaeology, and perhaps nationalism, which is relatively recent, is only one of them (Trigger 1995: 266).

### **Importance of Nationalism for Archaeology**

Nationalism has been an interesting topic for sociocultural anthropologists for a long time (Abdi 2001: 51, Spencer et al. 1990: 283). Recently, archaeologists have also started showing interest in this topic by discussing nationalism from a new perspective to understand the relationship between archaeology and nationalism, the simultaneous use of archaeology and past for nationalist aims, and effects and influences of nationalism on the development and practice of archaeology in different parts of the world (Abdi 2001: 51, Diaz-Andreu 2001: 429, Kohl 1998: 224).

Timothy Kaiser explains that the recent interest of archaeologists in nationalism is related to their concern about two aspects of the relationship between past and present: first, the idea that many of our understandings about the past are coming from present

conditions and second, how archaeology has been in the service of current political agendas (1995: 99). In other words, not only the present circumstances can influence the interpretations of the past but also can select certain events or aspects of the past to serve the present goals (1995: 113).

Philip Kohl believes that the popularity of this topic is related to both internal and external reasons. The first reason is the growth of nationalistic movements and conflicts around the world (1998: 224). For example, the dissolution of the Soviet Union and reconstructions of countries in East Europe caused many national and ethnic conflicts. Many of these conflicts, such as the case of Balkan, were involved with territorial claims based on archaeological records and remote past (Kaiser 1999: 113, Kohl 1998: 224). These events can show the political uses of archaeological remains and the importance of archaeological records for nationalistic purposes (Kohl 1998: 224).

The second reason is the development of the practice of archaeology and “advances in the broader historical study of nationalism” (Kohl 1998: 224). The history of archaeology reveals the social and political settings in which archaeology functions. This affair directs us to the discourse on the relationship between archaeology and politics (1998: 224). The last reason is related to the rise of post-processual archaeology, reject of objectivity, and the possibility of managing neutral research (1998: 225). As discussed before, this new approach gave value to the subjective interests of archaeologists and the political context in which scholars conduct their studies.

The relationship between nationalism and archaeology is changing. For a long time, archaeologists were in the service of nationalistic programs with "visible material remains within a national territory" (Kohl 1998: 225). Today, archaeology is a discipline which has something to contribute, more than just providing evidence for "land claims, ethnic superiority, or historical lineages" (Meskell 2002: 280). Kohl also claims that many archaeologists are now critically looking at manipulations of archaeological records for nationalist purposes (1998: 225).

In the study of nationalism and archaeology, it is also important to notice that the relationship between archaeology and nationalism has both positive and negative sides (Trigger 1995: 272). On the positive side, nationalist archaeology has been asking questions about the local cultural configurations and ethnicity that colonial and evolutionary archaeologists did not consider focusing on (1995: 272). It also encouraged archaeologists to systematically "trace spatial variations in the archaeological record" (Trigger 1995: 269). On the negative side, nationalist archaeology has encouraged archaeologists to misinterpret archaeological evidence for political aims (1995: 272).

### **Archaeology and Nationalism**

Bruce Trigger believes that the development of archaeology, especially the European prehistoric archaeology, is mostly related to nationalism (1984: 358). As discussed in chapter two, nationalism emerged first in Europe in the late eighteenth century and early nineteenth century (Spencer et al. 1990: 283).

Mazariegos explains that in the nineteenth century, nationalists found belonging to a historical state necessary in defining nationalities, which led them to search for their ancestries among ancient societies based on ethnic or territorial continuity (Mazariegos 1998: 376). For example, Diaz-Andreu explains that during the nineteenth century, in Spain, like many other states in Europe, historical studies and archaeological projects received a lot of attention when the state needed material remains to reconstruct the national past (1995: 39). Since then, nationalism has been recognized as an influential force for antiquarian studies, and still “provides the intellectual basis for many regional traditions of archaeology” (Mazariegos 1998: 376).

From the late nineteenth century on, the use of archaeology for nationalistic and political goals became more prominent to declare political independence or unification of territories (Diaz-Andreu 2001: 437, Sommer 2017: 166). Trigger explains that to meet these goals, sometimes governments support archaeological projects to conduct studies towards strengthening patriotic spirits. Excavations at Mont Auxios and Mont Rea during Napoleon III to find Celtic life in France are a few examples of such use of archaeology (1984: 358).

In other cases, the purpose of excavations was to glorify the national past to encourage a spirit of unity and cooperation within the states (Trigger 1984: 358). Denmark is a great example to show how prehistoric archaeology developed in Europe. Danish national pride broke down first during the Napoleonic time, and later in the nineteenth century by Germans. Trigger suggests that there is no surprise that Danes used

history and archaeology to find evidence to show their past national greatness (1984: 358). In another example, Trigger looks at Mexico and explains that after the Revolution of 1910 in Mexico, to support the national unity, the goal of archaeology became increasing people's knowledge of pre-Hispanic civilization of the country by glorifying past and honoring the native people's achievements (1984: 359).

States support archaeological projects for various means. The authorized versions of the past can help the current states to claim, justify, or legitimize their authority and policies (Kaiser 1995: 113, Kohl et al. 2007: 18). For this aim, archaeology is an indispensable instrument to search for the past (Diaz-Andreu 2001: 437); it is a symbolic resource and controlling that resource is as important as controlling any other resources that can protect the state power (Kaiser 1995: 113, Silberman 1995: 249). In this regard, archaeology is not only an essential discipline to glorify the past but to legitimize the existing cultures, and a powerful tool to reinvent them. (Abu El-Haj 1998: 168). Trigger also believes that studying the past will continue because it has shown its value for the present (1984: 368) and future political situation of a nation (Sommer 2017: 166).

Sometimes, archaeological remains can be used to prove that one specific area had been settled by one particular group of people in the past. Gustaf Kossinna, the German prehistory archaeologist, used the cultural diffusion idea, which was later known as Kossinna's Kulturkreis theory (Arnold 1990: 464). As discussed earlier in this chapter, the diffusion theory suggests that changes and models are spread from more advanced neighbors to less developed societies (Renfrew and Bahn 2012:263). Based on this idea,

Kossinna used the archaeological evidence to claim that Poland was “an age-old Germanic homeland” (Sommer 2017:179)

Another example is the 1963-1965 excavations at Masada by Israeli archaeologists (Ben-Yehuda 2007: 249). The project was conducted by Yigael Yadin, and the goal was to link the Jewish population to ancient Israel and by doing so proclaimed the right of this population to the land (Trigger 1984: 358). Ben-Yehuda argues that perhaps, the excavation at Masada is an excellent example to show how archaeology and politics are connected (2007: 272). We will discuss the case of Masada and the practice of archaeology in Israel later in this chapter.

In some countries, where the focus of archaeological studies is on the historical period, the situation might get complicated (Trigger 1984: 359). Iran and Egypt tend to glorify the pre-Islamic era when they had secular and nationalist governments, but de-emphasize this era and focus more on Islamic period when the governments were in favor of a pan-Islamic (Iran) or a pan-Arab (Egypt) orientation (1984: 359).

The association between nation-building, nationalism, and the development of archaeology is so clear throughout the nineteenth and most of the twentieth century that no one can question it (Kohl 1998: 228). Kohl and Fawcett argue that almost all the practicing archaeologists are aware of the relationship between archaeology and nationalism; and believe that “nationalist archaeology is almost always recognizable” (Kohl and Fawcett 1995: 14).

From the late 1860s, when nationalism became a significant political force, it started to influence archaeology and played a crucial role in shaping archaeological research (Trigger 1995: 268). As a result of industrialization, states in western Europe started to face many challenges including class conflicts. To act against these issues, the conservative elements began to emphasize ideas which supported the historical and biological unity of nations and blamed other national groups for political, economic, and social problems (Trigger 1984: 358, Trigger 1995: 268).

The primary use of nationalist archaeology is to reinforce the national pride of a nation (Trigger 1984: 360). This use of archaeology is most beneficial for those countries which are politically insecure, or those that are struggling with serious gaps between different classes (1984: 360). From the late nineteenth century, archaeologists have provided nationalists with useful material symbols and helped them to create “historical memories shared by all the members of the nation” (Diaz-Andreu 2001: 437).

As part of this study, we will discuss six examples to show how archaeological findings were used in battles and arguments of modern ethnic groups and nations (Silberman 1995: 249). This attempt can happen in different ways: by creating a link between the current governors and the sources of power in the remote past, by claiming the superiority of a nation based on the achievements in the past, by glorifying the present and presenting the past in an unfavorable way (Kaiser 1999: 113), or by using material remains and diffusionism to legitimize modern territorial expansions (Silberman 1995: 249).

The development and practice of archaeology and its relationship to politics and nationalism differed from one nation to another (Diaz-Andreu and Champion 1996: 12, Kohl 1998: 228). Kohl explains that first, each state has its unique history, and second, the archaeological evidence varied according to the “availability of historical records, the relative weighting of historical to archaeological sources, and the empirical contents of those records” (Kohl 1998: 228). However, as we will discuss different cases in the following pages, in all countries archaeology was used to justify ethnic, racial, linguistic, religious, and cultural basis of a nation (Diaz-Andreu and Champion 1996: 12).

France, Spain, and Germany are the first three states which will be reviewed. The reasons that Europe is essential in this study are: first, that archaeology was first developed in Europe. It was also in Europe where nationalists started using archaeology for political aims. Also, “European archaeology deals with quite a coherent set of problems, and broadly similar archaeological record from prehistory to modern times” (Diaz-Andreu and Champion 1996: 12). Then, we will look at Iraq, Turkey, and Israel and discuss the relationship between nationalism and archaeology among Iran’s neighbors in the Middle East.

### **Archaeology and Nationalism: France**

French archaeologists have different perspectives about the role of archaeology in the construction of French national identity. Alain Schnapp (1996) argues that in France, archaeology has always been in the service of history and that “without excavations and

without museums, archaeology's contribution [in the construction of French national identity] was minimal" (Schnapp 1996: 54). On the other hand, other archaeologists such as Michael Dietler (1994) believes that archaeology had a significant role in turning peasants into Frenchmen (Kohl 1998: 228).

In "*Our Ancestors the Gauls*": *Archaeology, Ethnic Nationalism, and the Manipulation of Celtic Identity in Modern Europe*, Dietler examines how archaeology has collaborated in the process of inventing the national past, and the way it helped to build what Benedict Anderson (2016) calls "imagined communities." In this paper, Dietler looks at Celtic people of western Europe, and write about Vercingetorix, the leader of the last defense of Gaul against the Romans (1994: 584). He explains that while there are many other important cases to study in Europe, this paper focuses on Celtic situation in France, because Celtic identity has been "a widespread, diverse, and important force in recent European history" (Dietler 1994: 585) and because the relationship between Celtic identity and Iron Age archaeology needs more explorations (1994: 585).

It was in Greek writings that the term Celt first appeared in the historical record during the late sixth century B.C. (Dietler 1994: 585). For people of the Mediterranean world, Celts were the first aliens who used to live on the northern borders. While Greeks preferred to call these people Celts, Romans as Julius Caesar noted: "used the term Gauls to designate people who called themselves Celts" (Dietler 1994: 585). Strabo (1923) also

wrote that Greeks called the people of southern France Celts because Greeks used this term to talk about the barbarian people of northwestern Europe (1994: 586).

Even though people of Britain and Ireland spoke dialects similar to continental Gaul, the classical authors never called these people Celts (Dietler 1994: 386). Today, many scholars use the term Celtic to address those who used to speak related languages of the Indo-European family in the first millennium B.C. (1994: 386). However, Dietler argues that linguistic unity cannot mislead us to think that all the populations who spoke related languages shared the Celtic culture. He suggests that it is better to think about ancient Celtic speakers as a network of independent societies who spoke related languages, linked by exchange, and shared some cultural elements (1994: 386). The author explains that considerable variation can be seen in political organization and sociocultural structures in these populations which indicates that it is unlikely that the people of these diverse societies had a “cohesive collective identity or ethnonym [...] or a unified political community” (Dietler 1994: 586).

During the French Revolution (1789), the Celtic identity was used both to oppose the nobility and to unify the popular movement of nationalism “by which the nation was defined as a community” (Dietler 1994: 587). Post-revolutionary France also used Celtic identity to create a national identity for an invented community of people who could not even speak the same language (Dietler 1994: 587). Celtic studies and promoting the popular Celtic identity were supported by both Napoleon Bonaparte and Napoleon III (Dietler 1994: 588, Sommer 2017: 184).

Dietler argues that both Napoleon Bonaparte and Napoleon III were more interested in Roman Empire and believed that Romans brought civilization to Gaul, secured people of this area with a better future, and helped them to improve their lives from barbarism to civilized (Dietler 1994: 590). On the one hand, Napoleon wanted his empire to be known as the continuation of the Roman empire and asserted that all the public monuments must be built in the style of the Romans (1994: 588). On the other hand, he promoted the popular tradition of the Celtic identity when in 1805 he founded the *Academie Celtique*, with Empress Josephine as the patron of the academy (Dietler 1994: 588). The primary goal was to conduct research about Celtic antiquities and language to avenge their ancestors and “to restore to the Celts the glory they deserved” (Johanneau 1807: 62). On the other hand, the political goal of funding this project was a way to justify the military expansion of the borders of the French Empire, which was to reclaim all the ancient territory of the Celts (Dietler 1994: 588). Dietler (1994) argues that based on Johanneau (1807) claims, the ideology behind these territory expansions was the idea that everyone in Europe are descendants of the Celts who are reunited as a single family (Dietler 1994: 588), but “France should have the best and largest part of the glorious heritage of the Celts” (Johanneau 1807: 42).

In 1852, when Napoleon III became in power, once again the conflict between Roman and Celtic identities returned (Dietler 1994: 588). This conflict was more focused on two characters “in the historical drama of the Roman conquest: Vercingetorix and Caesar” (Dietler 1994: 588). Vercingetorix who was the king of the Arverni, the person

who united all tribes of Gaul against Romans, became a national hero (Sommer 2017: 184). From his personal treasury, Napoleon III commissioned the bronze statue of Vercingetorix with his face at Alesia, one of the sites of the battles between Celts and Romans (Dietler 1994: 589, Kohl 1998: 228, Sommer 2017: 184). Napoleon III also showed interest in the history and culture of Celts for the national pride of France (Dietler 1994: 589). He financed excavations in Alesia and Bibracte (Sommer 2017: 184). The result of these efforts made Alesia the symbol of colonial legitimacy and French patriotism (Dietler 1994: 590).

The Celtic heritage once again was manipulated for the factionalism of French political life in the twentieth century, especially during and after the Second World War (Dietler 1994: 593). Vercingetorix received a lot of attention and was listed as one of the French national heroes, the history of Celtic culture was taught in school, comic books and the images of Celtic heritage in France could be seen everywhere and on everything, and scholarly papers about Vercingetorix and Celtic matters were published by intellectuals (1994: 593).

Since the Second World War, the Celts have been used as “an ethnic root of European unity” (Sommer 2017: 185). However, Dietler argues that considering Celts as the European identity has several problems (Dietler 1994: 596). This idea is only in favor of those nations which have a well-developed nationalist theory of Celtic identity. Besides, if the history of Europe started with the Celts, then nations like France can easily claim to be the “heart of that new and old Europe” (Dietler 1994: 596).

Being aware of the nationalist archaeology in France is crucial for this study because of its critical role in establishing the French school in both Classical and Near Eastern worlds, first in Rome and Athens, and later in Iran, Egypt, Afghanistan, and Algiers (Kohl 1998: 228). In the following chapter, we will review the history of French archaeology in Iran from the late nineteenth century to the early twentieth century in details. The case of French archaeology shows “how different ethnic groups and events were firmly linked to opposing political parties” (Sommer 2017: 185). Very similar to many other states, French nationalists also used archaeological records, research, and excavations of Celtic heritage for political aims (Dietler 1994: 597). However, the way they used archaeology was not abusive, like the way Nazi Germany did to justify territorial expansion and genocide (Dietler 1994: 599).

#### **Archaeology and Nationalism: Germany**

Although Germany had an interest in imperialism, German archaeology has always been limited to nationalistic traditions (Trigger 1984: 360). Very similar to France, the focus of German nationalist archaeology was Classical sites (Kohl 1998: 229). In 1829, private individuals who had an interest in Classical antiquities established the *Institut für Archäologische Korrespondenz* and sometimes received financial support from the state in the middle of the nineteenth century (1998: 229). In 1872, this institute became the *Deutsches Archäologisches Institut*, “a heavily state-subsidized organization meant to showcase the achievements of German scholarship” (Kohl 1998: 229).

During the late nineteenth century, the focus of German nationalist archaeology was mainly on Classical lands and the ancient Near East (Kohl 1998: 229). The result of this interest was the lack of attention to German prehistory which was first addressed by Gustaf Kossinna (1911). Kossinna was trying to find archaeological evidence to prove that “Germany was the homeland of the Indo-European peoples and the center of cultural creativity in prehistoric times” (Trigger 1984: 360). He argued that while other Indo-Europeans moved around and interbred, Germans were the only ones who kept their racial purity (1984: 360). These ideas were prevailing views for nationalism and received strong support from the prominent Nazi leaders (Kohl 1998: 229, Trigger 1984: 360).

Arnold (1990) in her article, *The Past as Propaganda: Totalitarian Archaeology in Nazi Germany*, discusses the ways archaeology was used by Nazi Germany before and during the Second World War to support the nationalist and racist agendas, and to justify territorial expansions (Arnold 1990: 464, Dietler 1994: 599). Arnold also explains how German nationalist archaeology, led by Kossinna, proposed the cultural diffusion theory, which later became known as Kossinna’s *Kulturkreis* theory (1990: 464).

As discussed earlier in this chapter (page number), diffusion theory suggests that ideas and models are spread from more advanced societies to less developed communities when they came into contact (Arnold 1990: 464). “The identification of geographical regions with specific ethnic groups on the basis of material culture” (Arnold 1990: 464), and the distribution of archaeological maps brought theoretical support to the

expansionist aims of National Socialists: wherever archaeologists could find a Germanic style material, the land was considered ancient German territory (1990: 465).

Alfred Rosenberg (1930), one of the ideologists of the Party, had a critical role in legislating ethnocentric and xenophobic perspectives (Arnold 1990: 465, Kohl 1998: 229). He believed “an individual to whom the tradition of his people (Volkstum) and the honor of his people (Volkshre) is not a supreme value, has forfeited the right to be protected by that people” (Germanenerbe 1938: 105). The result of this perspective was the neglect of non-Germanic data. During the 1930s, archaeologists who were interested in Roman archaeology were labeled *Römlinge* and considered as anti-German (Arnold 1990: 465).

However, Arnold argues that the connection between prehistory and politics was “not a new product of the National Socialist regime” (Arnold 1990: 465). Following the rise of nationalism and the Pan-European geographic divisions before the First World War, the discipline started to evolve (1990: 465). In 1909, Kossinna established the German Society for Prehistory in Berlin which later became known as Society for German Prehistory (Arnold, 1990: 465). Prehistory had a crucial role in restoring German self-respect after the defeat of 1918 (1990: 465).

Kossinna’s approach to archaeology was very influential in using archaeology as a political tool for German National Socialism (Arnold 1990: 466). We can see the result of this influence and the gradual changes in journal titles. For example, the Original Latinate title of *Mannus-Bibliothek* changed to the Germanic *Mannus-Bücherei* and went

back to *Mannus-Bibliothek* after the war (1990: 467). In another occasion, on the creation of the new Polish land in 1919, Kossinna published the article "*The German Ostmark, home territory of the German*" (1919) to support Germany's claim on Polish lands based on the archaeological evidence (1990: 467).

Another significant result of the ethnocentric attitude was the "exaggeration of the importance of Germanic cultural influences in Western civilization" (Arnold 1990: 467). On a dinner table monologue, Hitler shared his idea by claiming that "Greeks were Germans who had survived a northern natural catastrophe and evolved a highly developed culture in southern contexts" (Arnold 1990: 467). Based on this claim, in December 1941, archaeologists conducted a nine-week expedition in Greece and claimed to have discovered major new evidence of Indo-Germanic migration to Greece during the Neolithic (1990: 467).

The focus of Germany on prehistoric archaeology under the Nazi Party resulted in the advancement and development of this discipline at universities (Arnold 1990: 468). Between 1933 to 1935, "eight new chairs were created in German prehistory" (Arnold 1990: 468). Allocating unprecedented scale of funding for prehistoric excavations across Germany and many sites in Eastern Europe, establishment of museums for prehistory, displays of prehistoric collections for the first time, production of archaeological film series, and publications of archaeological journals are some of the other outcomes of political use of prehistoric archaeology during National Socialists (1990: 468).

The attention that Nazis dissipated on German prehistoric archaeology, the way they used and misinterpreted archaeological remains for political purposes, supported their racist, ethnocentric, and xenophobic doctrine but left archaeology in a catastrophic situation, “leaving behind a Faustian legacy from which the discipline has yet to recover fully” (Kohl 1998: 229). Arnold believes that the most important legacy of Nazi German archaeology is the fact that changing the past for political purposes is not beneficial either for the discipline nor the people of the state (1990: 476).

The influence of Nazi Germany on Iran is a critical discussion for historians. Reza Shah, the fierce nationalist king of Iran from 1925 to 1941, was in power around the same time Nazis were controlling Germany (Abdi 2001: 57). Reza Shah changed the name of the country from Persia to Iran (the land of Aryans) when the “Aryan race” was the subject of debate and political propaganda in Europe (2001: 63). Abdi explains that there are rumors that this idea came from the Iranian embassy in Berlin (2001: 63).

#### **Archaeology and Nationalism: Spain**

The development of archaeology and its relationship with nationalism was a different experience in Spain. First, it did not happen during the imperial expansion like France nor imperial aspiration like Germany (Kohl 1998: 230). In fact, during the early nineteenth century, while major powers in Europe were expanding their imperial territories around the world, Spain was losing colonies in Latin America and other possessions at the end of the century (Diaz-Andreu 1995: 43, Kohl 1998: 230). As a

result of this situation, the nationalist movement and the study of archaeology became prominent to reproduce the Spanish national identity (Diaz-Andreu 1995:39). On the other hand, the case of Spanish archaeology shows how ethno-nationalist ideologies have ruined archaeology and have played a critical role in “creating senses of identities for people in the autonomies of Catalonia, the Basque country, and Galicia” (Kohl and Fawcett 1995: 7).

Margarita Diaz-Andreu (1995) in her article, *Archaeology and Nationalism in Spain*, analyzes the emergence of nationalism as a political doctrine and its influence in forming archaeology as a scientific discipline in Spain (Diaz-Andreu 1998: 39). She argues that development of archaeology in Spain, very similar to most of Europe, was related to the need to find evidence for “the reconstruction of the remotest periods of the national past” (Diaz-Andreu 1998: 39).

Diaz-Andreu (1995) believes that comparing to the nationalist movement in other European countries such as France, Britain, and Germany, Spanish nationalism was weak and hesitant (1995: 43). Losing the Latin American empire in addition to the state’s vulnerable position; it was difficult for Spain to construct the image of a glorious nation (1995: 43). However, other ways were used to praise the Spanish national identity. For example, the glorification of Castile, the War of Independence against Napoleon or the exaltation of their national past by emphasizing “the heroic defense of pre-Roman cities like Saguntum and Numantia against their invaders” (Diaz-Andreu 1995: 43).

As a result of the weakness of Spanish nationalism, archaeology received limited attention in the nineteenth century, and the interest in excavations and glorification of the national past were negligible (Diaz-Andreu 1995: 43). For example, in 1803, excavations of the Celtiberian town of Numantia were conducted. However, the result of these excavations was never published, and the data from the excavations were lost (1994: 43).

Construction of national history began in the middle of the nineteenth century (Diaz-Andreu 1995: 41). During the late nineteenth century and the twentieth century, Spanish intellectuals understood the necessity to create a national identity. This need and the “upsurge of Spanish nationalism in the twentieth century was reflected in archaeology” (Diaz-Andreu 1995: 44). For example, Numantia finally became serious, and in 1905, a memorial monument was set up on the site, and Alfonso XIII, the king of Spain, inaugurated it (1995: 44).

During and after the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939), archaeology remained to be used as a political tool (Diaz-Andreu 1995: 46). After the Civil War, and during the Franco era (1939-1975), most of the archaeological research was focused on Spain under the Romans and the Visigoths. The Roman period became important because it was believed to be the first time Spain had been united, it was during this time that Spain learned how to act like an empire, and Christianity entered Spain (1995: 46). Because of Franco’s interest in Nazi Germany, Spanish archaeologists tried to find an Aryan presence in Spain during the Visigoths era (1995: 46).

After the Second World War, archaeology started to lose its political influence. Gradually, the goal of practicing archaeology became, “first, to impose order on the data and then to describe it” (Diaz-Andreu 1995: 46). Archaeology became an endless list of described materials which made it isolated (1995: 46). After Franco’s death in 1975, the process of democratization started in Spain. By 1985, “Spain was divided into seventeen self-governed autonomies” (Diaz-Andreu 1995: 46), and each of these autonomies used archaeology to manage its cultural heritage (1995: 46).

One significant aspect of Diaz-Andreu study is the case of Catalan, Basque, and Galician nationalism and archaeology. As mentioned before, the importance of constructing a national past became important in Spain in the middle of the nineteenth century (Diaz-Andreu 1995: 41). From the 1880s on, in Catalonia, the Basque country, and, to a lesser extent, Galicia, a lot of efforts were made to create national histories and to justify their nation’s eternal existence by linking their race, language, customs, and geography to the remote past (1995: 41). Diaz-Andreu claims that in all three cases, archaeology had a crucial role in the creation of these national myths (1995: 41). Even though all three cases are unique and essential, only the case of Catalan archaeology will be reviewed in the following paragraphs.

In the middle of the nineteenth century, nationalism emerged in Catalonia (Diaz-Andreu 1995: 47). However, archaeology was not influenced by Catalan nationalism until 1906, when Enric Prat de la Riba used archaeology in nationalistic terms in his book *La nacionalitat catalana* (1995: 47). In this book, Prat de la Riba “based Catalan

nationalism on the Catalan language” (Diaz-Andreu 1995: 47) and believed that the roots of Catalonia could be found in the pre-Roman Iberian ethnos (1995: 47). In 1907, under Prat de la Riba’s direction, two institutions were created in the Barcelona: the *Institut d’Estudis Catalans* (Institute for Catalan Studies) and the *Junta de Museus de Barcelona* (Commission of Barcelona Museums). Both of these institutions played a crucial role in the development of Catalan archaeology (1995: 47).

At the end of the Civil War in 1939, the Catalan archaeology transformed into a discipline and was at the service of the Francoist state (Diaz-Andreu 1995: 49). The School of Archaeology in Catalan did not recover until the 1960s and 1970s when Catalans returned to the school (1995: 49).

Catalonia became self-governed in 1982 (Diaz-Andreu 1995: 49). Nationalism is extreme in Catalonia; however, today there is no “tendency to subsidize research on any particular period” (Diaz-Andreu 1995: 49). On the other hand, as mentioned before, language is an integral part of nationalism in Catalan. Consequently, the language of scientific archaeological publications is Catalan (1995: 49). Interestingly, Catalan politicians use archaeology to legitimize the Catalan nation, very rarely (1995: 49).

The case of Catalan nationalism and the use of language is similar to the ways Reza Shah (1878-1944) used language in the service of nation-building (Perry 2004: 245). Under Reza Shah, Iranian teachers and students were encouraged to use pure Persian in their writings, which meant to avoid using Arabic words (2004: 247). The case

of language reform under Reza Shah and its results on the Iranian nationalism will be discussed in-depth in the following chapter.

### **Archaeology and Nationalism: Turkey**

Turkey has a unique position as being located between the West and the East (Özdoğan 2002: 111). However, Mehmet Özdoğan (2002) in his article *Ideology and Archaeology in Turkey*, argues that this uniqueness is not just about the geographical situation; in the last two centuries, Turkey “has vacillated between Western and marginal Western models” (Özdoğan 2002: 112). This position also has had an important impact on the formation of Anatolian cultures, and the creation of disciplines such as archaeology (2002: 12).

The practice of archaeology in Turkey began during the early years of the nineteenth century when the traditional Ottoman state (1299-1919) was going through the process of Westernization (Özdoğan 2002: 112). Özdoğan continues that the struggle to change the system in Turkey and the endeavor to make it more like the European one happened at the same time that the anti-Turkish tendency was a trend in Europe (2002: 112).

Confronting the traditional Islamic frameworks and the Western system, the effort to survive as a non-Arab state in the Middle East, the Europeans’ humiliation, the growing nationalism, and the rich archaeological potentials were influential in the development of archaeology in Turkey (Özdoğan 2002: 113). The author believes that the

development of archaeology is more related to the ideologies of the modern Republic of Turkey than its historical and archaeological potential (2002: 113).

The Ottoman Empire (today Turkey) was the first, and for a long time, the only non-European state “to meet the initial wave of European explorers and archaeologists” (Özdoğan 2002: 114). In 1846, some antiquities were exhibited in Istanbul, later in 1868, the collection was inaugurated as the Ottoman Imperial Museum, and finally, in 1891, this collection was moved to current Istanbul Archaeology Museum (2002: 114). During the early years of the twentieth century, many museums were already established in different provinces, such as Bursa, Konya, and Sivas (2002: 114). Since archaeology was an imported concept from Europe, most of the collections in museums consisted of Roman or Byzantine antiquities; even the Turkish excavations were more focused on site of Greco-Roman period (2002: 115).

In 1884, Osman Hamdi Bey, the most respected figure in Turkish archaeology, created a new law for the protection of antiquities, in which first, all antiquities considered to be the state’s property, and second, the export of antiquities were prohibited (Özdoğan 2002: 115). Özdoğan believes that this was a revolutionary decision and perhaps the most significant contribution by the Ottomans to archaeology (2002: 115).

During the first two decades of the twentieth century, the Ottoman Empire suffered from political and economic difficulties which led to a total collapse of the empire in 1919 after more than 600 years (Özdoğan 2002: 115). However, the first

generation of Turkish archaeologists managed to maintain the museums and kept them safe from losing any collections (2002: 115).

After the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and during the formation of the new Turkish state, one of the most critical concerns of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the founder of the new republic state, was to popularize and propagate Turkish identity (Özdoğan 2002: 116). This seemed like an impossible mission “since for centuries being a Turk was considered degrading” (Özdoğan 2002: 116). Under this situation, it was necessary to formulate a new ideology to support national pride. Most Turkish elite and intelligentsia believed that the best way to achieve national pride was to use the glorious history of Turkic origins in Central Asia by promoting the Pan-Turkist ideology. However, Atatürk rejected this idea and insisted on Anatolian as the homeland (2002: 116). To support this new idea, “an ethnohistorical theory was formulated, relating Sumerians and Hittites to the Turks, and integrated into the ideological framework of the new state” (Özdoğan 2002: 116). This ideology, with some amendments, has survived up to the present time and all the material remains and cultures that lived in Anatolia have been treated in the same way (2002: 117). Issuing research permits and funding archaeological projects, in both Byzantine and Turkish period, have also been treated equally (2002: 117)

Even though Western explorers removed and looted archaeological remains and antiquities in the past (Özdoğan 2002: 114), today Turkey is one of the only Middle Eastern countries to have a good relationship with both the local and foreign archaeological teams (2002: 117). However, unlike many other Middle Eastern countries

where young, inexperienced people can join the archaeological teams, the Turkish authorities have been very selective in giving permits to both foreigners and Turkish archaeologists (2002: 118).

Atatürk took part in the development of archaeology in the 1930s (Özdoğan 2002: 118). During this time a group of students was sent to Europe, mainly to France, Germany, and Hungary to study archaeology, the Turkish Historical Society was established, and the Turkish excavations resumed (2002: 118). Before the Second World War, Atatürk invited German professors who were running from Nazi Germany to Turkey. The entrance of these German professors and the return of Turkish students from Europe “led to a significantly high standard of teaching in archaeology” (Özdoğan 2002: 118). The significant aspect of the second generation archaeologists in Turkey was the increase in the number of female archaeologists (2002: 119). Today, females have a dominant role in archaeology in Turkey, which is unique among the Middle Eastern countries (2002: 119).

In Turkey, similar to other countries where the process of industrialization is happening, archaeological sites and monuments have suffered from major destructions (Özdoğan 2002: 119). However, Özdoğan (2002) argues that in Turkey none of these destructions are either culturally or religiously selective (2002: 119). Archaeology departments at different universities in Turkey are devoted to the pre-Turkish era, and excavation permits for Byzantine sites are not rejected (2002: 120).

As reviewed, the case of archaeology and nationalism in Turkey is unique in the Middle East. The importance of Turkish archaeology for this study is related to the fact that Atatürk was a mentor for Reza Shah. In the next chapter when we review the case of archaeology and nationalism under Reza Shah, the similarities between these two leaders will be discussed.

#### **Archaeology and Nationalism: Iraq**

The nationalist ideology and the practice of archaeology in Iraq should be reviewed from the end of the Ottoman era in the early twentieth century to the fall of the Ba'ath regime in 2003 (Abdi 2008: 3). In *From Pan-Arabism to Saddam Hussein's Cult of Personality: Ancient Mesopotamia and Iraqi National Ideology*, Kamyar Abdi (2008) reviews the practice of nationalist archaeology in Iraq with emphasis on "how Iraq's past, especially ancient Mesopotamia, was used by various Iraqi regime to promote [...] political agendas" (Abdi 2008: 3). He also discusses the ways Saddam Hussein used the ancient past to promote himself as "the latest manifestation of a great line of Mesopotamian leader-heroes" (Abdi 2008: 3).

The archaeological projects in Mesopotamia started in the 1840s and continued until the early twentieth century when the outbreak of the First World War stopped the explorations (Abdi 2008: 15). In 1918, the first post-war excavations in Iraq were planned and carried out by the British archaeologists Reginald Campbell Thompson (1876-1941), who conducted archaeological projects before the war at Nineveh, worked

as a captain in the British Intelligence Corps during the war, and was the representative of the British Museum after the war in Iraq (2008: 15). Thompson also launched excavations at Ur and Eridu after war (2008: 15). In 1922, the Iraqi Department of Antiquities was established by the British (2008: 15). During the 1920s and 1930s, archaeologists from different countries conducted several large-scale excavations in Mesopotamia (2008: 15).

In 1932, Iraq became independent, and the National Brotherhood Party took control of the government (Abdi 2008: 15). The new regime had a more nationalist approach. Abu-Khaldun Sati' al-Husri (1881-1968), one of the founders of Pan-Arabist ideology (Abdi 2008: 12), and described as “the intellectual prophet of Arab nationalism” (Dawisha 2003: 49), became the director of the Department of Antiquities in 1932 (Abdi 2008: 15). Very soon, Husri began changing the Antiquities Law which was passed in 1934 and restricted the rights of foreign scholars to archaeological data and the export of antiquities (2008: 15). Under Husri and later Najji al-Asil (1895-1963) the Department of Antiquities started independent excavations at Samarra, Wasit, Tell “Uqair,” Aqar Guf, Hassuna, Tell Harmal, and Eridu (2008: 16).

Taha Baqir (1912-1984) and Fuad Safar (1913-1978) were two Iraqi students who continued their education at the Oriental Institute of the University of Chicago and returned to Iraq (Abdi 2008: 17). Baqir and Safar were the founders of the archaeology department at Baghdad University, notable figures of the Department of Antiquities, and

“played a pivotal role in training the next generation of Iraqi archaeologists, most of whom came to work under the Ba’ath regime” (Abdi 2008: 17).

The Ba’ath party (1968-2003), the most radical pan-Arab political faction in the contemporary Arab world, came into power in Iraq in 1968 as a result of a military coup (Baram 1990: 425). Within a few months, the Ba’ath party started showing interest in Iraq’s pre-Islamic and pre-Arab history (Abdi 2008: 17, Baram 1990: 425). To avoid conflicts and criticism from inside the party and from pan-Arab supporters outside Iraq, they “chose to introduce its new credo of Iraqi territorial nationalism intertwined with an imperial Iraqi-centered brand of Pan-Arabism through a purely cultural, rather than an explicit political campaign” (Baram 1990: 425).

To achieve this goal, the party’s cultural campaign had three directions: 1) Iraqi folklore; music, folk stories and poetry, arts and crafts, and folk dances were recovered, 2) archaeological excavations, reconstruction, and establishment of museums, and 3) introducing a new, modern version of the ancient Mesopotamian spring rite (Baram 1990: 425). The purpose of this campaign was to create a vertical unity among the Iraqi people and their land and to fortify a horizontal bond between Arabs and Kurds, Shiites and Sunnis, Muslims and Christians (1990: 425).

Even though the Ba’ath party was careful and limited its campaigns to the cultural sphere during the first few years, stress on Iraqi identity and the promise that the Iraqi people are the eternal ones “was an unmistakable departure from Ba’ath party orthodoxy” (Baram 1990: 426). The new goal was the emphasis on Iraq’s pre-Islamic and, more

importantly, pre-Arab history (1990: 426). From 1968 to 1972, the budget of the Department of Antiquities increased by over 80 percent; a large amount of money was dedicated to archaeology and other related activities such as the renovation of historical monuments (Abdi 2008: 18). In 1979, the Department of Antiquities was reorganized into the State Organization for Antiquities and Heritage, and many archaeology graduates were hired by this department (2008: 18). Also, the number of archaeological excavations increased, and museums were built in different parts of the country to exhibit the history of Mesopotamian (2008: 18). In the 1970s, when the emphasis on archaeology became prominent, the number of excavations increased, too (Abdi 2008: 18). From 1968 (the year that Ba'ath party became in power) to 1980 (the year Iraq invaded Iran) around 50 archaeological teams from Europe, the United States, the Soviet Union, and Japan were conducting excavations and surveys in Iraq (2008: 18).

During the late 1970s, under Saddam Hussein's instructions, ideologues and historians worked on an Arab pedigree for the ancient Semitic people who were the inhabitants of Mesopotamia from Akkad through Chaldea (1990: 426). Based on this pedigree, historians and archaeologists concluded that the Semitic people came from the Arabian peninsula and argued that despite the differences between "Akkadian, Assyrian, and other ancient Semitic languages in Mesopotamia [...] and Arabic, the Semites should be regarded as Arabs" (Baram 1990: 426). With this idea, the Ba'athi intellectuals claimed the superiority of the Iraqi people over other Arab people (1990: 426).

Another major archaeological project under the Ba'ath regime was the reconstruction of Babylon (Abdi 2008: 19). Around \$30 million was dedicated to the project, professional archaeologists, architects, technicians, and laborers were employed to work on the project; however, due to technical difficulties, the progress was slow (2008: 19). In 1987, under the direct order from Saddam Hussein, archaeologists were instructed to "abandon careful reconstruction and to build Babylon without delay in anticipation of the upcoming Babylon International Festival" (Abdi 2008: 19).

The Ba'ath regime and Saddam Hussein emphasized on the reconstruction of Babylon (Abdi 2008: 19). Abdi (2008) explains that the Ba'ath regime was trying to promote unity and social homogeneity among different groups of Iraqi people (2008: 20). In this regard, Babylon had a vital location as it was located between the Sunni region of Iraq and the Shi'ite region (2008: 20). On the other hand, Saddam had his personal fascination with "Nebuchadnezzar, the most famous of the Neo-Babylonian kings" (Abdi 2008: 20). In the following years, Babylon became a center for different festivals, especially those related to Nebuchadnezzar and Saddam Hussein (Abdi 2008: 21). During the 1988 festival, a spectacle took place to show the reconstruction of Babylon and stressed that "from Nebuchadnezzar to Saddam Hussein, Babylon is rising again" (Abdi 2008: 21).

When Husri was the director of the Department of Antiquities, history was a crucial subject of the curriculum in different levels of education (Abdi 2008: 23). Saddam Hussein continued this tradition and believed that "the writing of history must be from

our [i.e., my] point of view, with an emphasis on analysis and not realistic storytelling” (Hussein 1979: 23).

The past, real or invented, has been playing a crucial role in promoting nationalism and political agendas around the world (Abdi 2008: 28). The case of Iraq under the Ba’ath regime and Saddam Hussein and their interest in ancient Mesopotamia is another example of this practice (2008: 28). Saddam Hussein’s speeches and writings show his elementary education and superficial knowledge of the past (Abdi 2008: 28). In this regard, Abdi (2008) argues that these ideas were coming from lower levels of the hierarchy and not Saddam Hussein himself (2008: 29). Abdi believes that in a country that fear is a fundamental part of everyday life, progress or even maintaining the status needs cringing before the superiors. He concludes that Saddam Hussein is not the only person to be blamed; equally responsible are everyone who helped to please the regime including

“archaeologists and historians who, by providing the Ba’ath regime with material from ancient Mesopotamia, betrayed their academic integrity and willingly or unwillingly allowed themselves to become a pawn in one of the greatest misuses of the past in modern times” (Abdi 2008: 29).

In modern Iraq, archaeology has been used to unify the nation and to create a sense of belonging among different religious and ethnic groups (Bernhardsson 2007:191). However, Abdi (2008) believes that even though the Ba’ath regime and Saddam Hussein tried to create a national identity and promote the unity among different religious and ethnic Iraqis; the looting of the National Museum in Baghdad and the destruction of

archaeological sites around the country after the fall of the Ba'ath regime in 2003, indicate the failure of this regime in creating "a sense of patrimony and respect for one's heritage in average Iraqis" (Abdi 2008: 31). Bernhardsson (2007) explains that archaeological museums were symbols of Saddam Hussein's regime and people associated archaeology and archaeological museums with Hussein's and his government so much that during wars and instability of the government, they attacked and looted the local museums (Bernhardsson 2007: 201).

Different ways that cultural productions and archaeology were used in Iraq to promote Saddam Hussein's cult of personality is similar to the case of Pahlavi kings (1925-1979) in Iran (Abdi 2008: 7). The Babylon International Festival of 1988 in Iraq, and the connection Saddam Hussein made between himself and Nebuchadnezzar as heroes of Iraq, is merely a reminder of the celebration of the 2500th anniversary of the foundation of the Persian empire by Cyrus the Great, the first Achaemenid King (Dezhamkhooy et al. 2015: 55). This ceremony was held in Persepolis in 1971 to link Mohammad Reza Shah's (1941-1979) throne to Cyrus (Abdi 2008: 7). Abdi argues that both of these celebrations were some of the most significant abuse of archaeology and ancient history by modern politicians (Abdi 2001: 68, Abdi 2008: 7). In the following chapter, the case of Pahlavi kings and their interest in archaeology will be discussed in depth.

### **Archaeology and Nationalism: Israel**

In the study of nationalism and archaeology, it is essential to review the case of nationalist archaeology in Israel, because as Kohl (1998) argues, archaeology has had a unique role in the construction of Israel and Israeli national identity (Kohl 1998: 237). He also contends that “archaeology has contributed more to this case of state formation than to any other” (Kohl 1998: 237). On the other hand, the case of nationalist archaeology in Israel is unique, because, for almost a century, people have been migrating to Palestine as a return to an ancestral homeland, a view that has been supported by excavations and archaeological remains from biblical times to declare the right of these migrated people to the land (Kohl 1998: 238, Trigger 1995: 358). According to this idea, the archaeology of Israel has three distinctive features: 1) the state has an interest in specific archaeological remains such as Masada (Ben-Yehuda 1995: 147), 2) excavations and presentation of the archaeological remains are selective and mostly dedicated to the reconstruction of Iron Age through early Roman era, and 3) the type of nationalism in Israel is the religious one which means that “archaeology fulfills a certain sacred or, for some, sacrilegious function” (Kohl 1998: 238). The case of Masada is an excellent example to understand the importance of archaeology in modern Israel.

Nachman Ben-Yehuda (2007) in his study *Excavating Masada*, explains that Josephus Flavius’s (1981) writings are the only historical sources about Masada, and without these writings, all we have is ruins in the Judean desert (Ben-Yehuda 2007: 249).

Yet, the story that secular Zionism tells us is entirely a different story; “it is a fabricated mythical tale of heroism that cannot be found in Josephus” (Ben-Yehuda 2007: 249).

Based on Josephus’s narrative, around AD 66-73, Jewish revolted against the Roman Empire; however, the revolt was a significant failure for Jews (Ben-Yehuda 2007: 255). It was a humiliating military and political defeat, and Roman burned the second Jewish temple (2007: 255). On the other hand, the Masada mythical narrative is a heroic, proud story (2007: 254). According to this tale, around AD 66 the Jews of the Provincia Judaea revolted against the Romans. Unfortunately, the Roman army defeated the revolt by destroying Jerusalem in AD 70 and burning the second Jewish temple (2007: 254). The remaining Zealots fled to Masada and fought the Roman for another three years. But, when they realized that they cannot defeat the Romans and had to choose between death and slavery, they all chose death and killed themselves (2007: 254).

The case of excavations at Masada is a prominent example of the politics of archaeology (Ben-Yehuda 2007: 251). Ben-Yehuda in his study looks at the main excavations at Masada from 1963 to 1965, directed by Yigael Yadin (1966), and claims that these excavations provided scientific credibility and reliability to “one of Israel’s prime and founding heroic myths” (Ben-Yehuda 2007: 249). The excavations at Masada became world famous and the site was named as a UNESCO World Heritage in 2001 (2007: 249). The excavation at Masada became the most famous archaeological project in Israel, and the second most publicized excavation in the twentieth century after the discovery of the tomb of Tutankhamen (2007: 249).

The main excavations of Masada took place first from October 1963 to April 1964, and the second between December 1964 and March 1965 (Ben-Yehuda 2007: 249). The leading supporter of this project was the Israeli army by contributing resources and volunteers, managing transportation, communications, providing food, water, equipment, and housing (2007: 250). Every day, around two hundred volunteers were working on the site, and every two weeks new volunteers would be replaced (2007: 250). This means that thousands of Israelis and non-Israelis participated in this archaeological project and learned about the tale of Masada in the most direct way (2007: 250).

Ben- Yehuda believes that it is difficult to estimate the cost of these excavations, however, it is assumed that the overall cost was US\$2 million by May 1996 (Ben-Yehuda 2007: 250). The financial support within Israel was very minimal, and much of the support came from outside Israel. All told, the archaeological excavation at Masada was a national and internal project (2007: 250). The final result of this project was published significantly late (Ben- Yehuda 2007: 250). Some reports were published in the 1960s and 1970s, but the final reports began to publish after Yadin's death (1984). Twenty-six years after the excavations, between 1989 and 1991, the summaries of the final reports were published in three volumes (2007: 250).

The author argues that the myth of Masada is invented because in the early 1940s founding fathers of the Jewish state needed a heroic story to help them create a new Jewish state and identity (Ben-Yehuda 2007: 254). He continues that building a powerful symbolic tale was necessary "to bridge the gap between heroic Jews then and heroic Jews

now” (Ben-Yehuda 2007: 254). They needed this heroic myth for their political and ideological statement that Jews have always been lived in Zion, fought for it, and, if required, died for it (2007: 254). In this regard, the Masada narrative became the foundation of national and personal identities of Israeli Jews (2007: 255). Years later, in the 1980s, the myth of Masada and the excavations were used for political purposes. Moshe Dayan (1983) argues that Jews have always been massacred and killing Jewish people has a pattern (Dayan 1983: 21). In this discussion, he examines the excavations at Masada and makes a direct line from Masada to the Holocaust (1983: 21).

As mentioned above, the case of excavations at Masada provides us an excellent example to examine how archaeology and politics are connected (Ben-Yehuda 2007: 272). Yadin and his followers interpreted the archaeological remains of Masada in a way to support the mythical narrative, “which is a political, ideological narrative” (Ben-Yehuda 2007: 272). This goal was not achieved by falsifying any artifacts or archaeological data, but “rather by contextualizing these findings within the mythical narrative” (Ben-Yehuda 2007: 273). This was done mostly by creating explanations about finding (2007: 273).

The case of Masada and the way Yadin and other archaeologists helped the state to support their political, ideological narrative is perhaps a great example to understand the role of archaeologists and the way their interpretations and explanations can help the state to use archaeology for their political agendas. Ben-Yehuda believes that Yadin and his colleagues were aware of the original narrative, yet they chose “to tailor their version

to what they felt were personal and national needs” (Ben-Yehuda 2007: 253). In this regard, it is crucial to review the ethical and professional responsibilities of archaeologists in such situations.

### **Archaeology and Nationalism: Ethical and Professional Responsibilities of Archaeologists**

Archaeological remains are mute objects from the past which are in danger of misinterpretations. Our understanding from prehistory and early history is established based on these objects. The discipline has also developed with these records and the interpretation of cultural remains (Kohl 1998: 241).

There are no questions that archaeology and politics are interrelated (Kohl 1998: 242). Archaeological remains and the practice of archaeology have inherently been political; cultural remains have been excavated, interpreted in a political context, and used for various political goals, including legitimizing nationalist means (1998: 241). However, Kohl argues that “archaeology is not equated with politics or nationalism” (1998: 242). He continues that these two are related, but they are separated phenomena (1998: 242). As mentioned before, Trigger argues that most of the archaeological projects have been in the service of nationalists and their aims (1984: 358). He also suggests that:

Nationalism is not a unitary concept but one that affects individual human beings in different ways and to different degrees. How we perceive both our personal circumstances and nationalism affecting our lives determines our attitude toward this manifestation of group unity. Because of this, archaeology’s relations with nationalism are affected by what they understand to be in their self-interest” (Trigger 1995: 278).

Based on this idea, it is necessary for archaeologists to be aware of their personal biases before making the final decision on archaeology's role in nationalistic programs (Trigger 1995: 278). However, whatever the personal opinions are, nothing can justify the deliberate misinterpretation or distortion of archaeological remains for nationalistic and political reasons (1995: 278). Dietler also suggests that archaeologists, as experts who study the remote past, should be aware of their situation in this process, to understand how nationalism "informs their practice by conducting research goals, interpretations, and evaluation of knowledge claims," (Dietler 1994: 585) and also to recognize their responsibilities in this process (1994: 585).

Archaeologists should also be aware of the political, economic, and intellectual factors of their work environment. *Trigger believes that often, the political condition of a state can influence the archaeological projects by dictating archaeologists what to say about archaeological records (1995: 265).* When archaeologists face political situations, their professional responsibility is to be straightforward and to be honest that the interpretation of remains is uncertain and limited (1998: 241). Many examples show how archaeologists have reacted to political forces. In this context, the response of German archaeologists to National Socialists doctrine is worth mentioning.

German pre-historians and archaeologists of 1930s and 1940s can be categorized into three groups: the party-liners, the passive majority, and the critical opposition (Arnold 1990: 471).

The party-liners were those archaeologists who achieved their academic legitimacy when the National Socialists was in power or before that but conducted their studies in favor of the Party's politics (Arnold 1990: 470). Herman Wirth (1885-1981), Herman Wille (1894-1980), and Wilhelm Teudt (1860-1952) were some of these extremists, who were derisively called *Germanomaniacs* or Germanmaniacs (1990: 470). Even some of the pioneer party-liner researchers such as Hans Reinerth and Oswald Menghin became high-ranking officials during the Nazis. Arnold argues that researchers "consciously participated in what was at best a distortion of scholarship, and at worst a contribution to the legitimation of a genocidal authoritarian regime" (Arnold 1990: 471). She continues that they were aware that most of the research they were conducting "had absolutely no basis archaeological facts" (1990: 471). Reinerth's book *The Prehistory of the German Tribes* (1945), for instance, has a racist tone, and argues the genetic superiority of the German people and claimed that anywhere resided by German people at present or in the past, belongs to the Germans (1990: 471).

The mitläufer group included the majority of German archaeologists, were the passive followers (Arnold 1990: 472). They just followed the instructions; taught what they were told to teach and did what they were instructed to do. They just took the state funding without any questions. Arnold believes that the silence of this group shows the dictatorial policies of the National Socialists (1990: 472).

The most visible group is the opposition group, who were only a few and the victims of the regime (Arnold 1990: 472). These archaeologists were persecuted in

Germany because of their racial background, political views, or sometimes both. For example, in 1935, Gerhard Bersu was forced to retire by the National Socialists because he refused to conduct research which was in favor of the National Socialists ideologies. He also rejected the Kossinna school and its nationalist, racist doctrine (1990: 472).

Some archaeologists who were against the racist ideology of Kossinna school managed to keep their positions (Arnold 1990: 472). K.H. Jacob-Friesen was one of these German prehistorians. He believed that the distortion of archaeological remains for nationalist and racist aims was “a defamatory attack on German scholarship and the international reputation of German scholars” (Arnold 1990: 472).

The cases of Gustaf Kossinna (1919) and Yigael Yadin (1966) show the critical role of archaeologists in interpreting the past and ways that these explanations can be used for political purposes. Trigger (1995) reminds us that the accurate interpretation of the past can help archaeologists to improve the status of their discipline and show the real power of archaeology as a “positive force in human history” (Trigger 1995: 279).

It is also necessary for archaeologists to accept the political aspects of their discipline and be aware of its moral and ethical consequences. Kohl suggests that archaeologists must be capable of understanding the difference between what they say as professional archaeologists and their personal opinion and ways that their knowledge can be used or misused for political and nationalist purposes (1998: 242). Trigger also believes that archaeologists must be aware of their moral duty, especially when biased interpretations “can be used to justify one group of people inflicting pain or injustice on

another” (Trigger 1995: 279). It is also necessary for archaeologists to stay unbiased and to be aware that all cultures and traditions need to be recognized and all of them are worthy of study and respect (Kohl 1998: 242).

### **Nationalism and Archaeology: Role of Museums**

Another important concept related to both nationalism and archaeology is the role of museums. The relationship with nationalism, affected archaeology (Diaz-Andreu and Champion 1996: 9). Before the nineteenth century, archaeology was mostly stories about ancient times. However, in the nineteenth century, it received attention and considered important enough to be a discipline (1996: 9). As a result, museums were opened, archaeology became a major at universities, and laws and legislation were created to protect antiquities and support archaeological excavations (1996: 9). Museums became the foundations of historical knowledge where the cultural objects were stored; these objects then helped to create a national history (1996: 9).

During the late eighteenth century, concepts such as utility, citizenship, and the nation became important concepts and made changes in the political sphere (Diaz-Andreu 2001: 431). Then the administrative reorganization became necessary for states (2001: 431). To achieve this goal, and to spread these new concepts, education became essential and the study of classical past received importance at schools (2001: 431). Diaz-Andreu continues that this situation helped the institutionalization of some specific fields such as archaeology (2001: 431). Museums were opened and the process of institutionalization of

archaeology by exhibiting the antiquities from the classical era and objects from the excavations (2001: 432). In this regard, everything related to classical antiquity gained importance and keeping them in private collections was then considered to be “against the common good, against citizen’s education” (Diaz-Andreu 2001: 431).

In 1733, the first archaeology museum, the *Museum Capitolino*, was opened to the public in the city of Rome and later in 1771, joined by the *Museum Pio Clementino* (Diaz-Andreu 2001: 431). Private collections were also given to museums. In Britain, Sir Hans Sloane, who owned a private collection of classic works of art, gave his collection to the state. In 1753, the collection was displayed to a wider public, and finally, the British Museums was inaugurated in 1759 (2001: 431).

The opening of museums can also be studied in the colonial context (Anderson 2016: 164, Meskell 1998: 3). Benedict Anderson (2016) in his book *Imagined Communities*, by emphasizing on the importance of the colonial context, argues that three institutions - census, maps, and museums - were developed and shaped by colonial states in a way that they imagined their dominions (2016: 164). Antiquities and artifacts became the symbol of old traditions and museums were opened to show how the state is protecting and preserving these traditions (2016: 164). Meskell (1998) explains that by opening museums western countries were looking for a shared identity. She also classes museums as one of the endowments of colonial power in which archaeological pasts are deeply embedded (1998: 3). Excavating and collecting artifacts from different cultures

and displaying them in the museums helped the colonial powers to go beyond national boundaries (Macdonald 2003: 2).

In some situations, such as Mexico, the emphasis on the pre-Hispanic past is a reaction to the colonial era and an effort to unite the people by glorifying a shared, remote past. In Mexico, Octavio Paz supported the opening of the National Museum of Archaeology, a magnificent building to display the great culture of Mesoamerica as the antecedent of the Aztec civilization. Different monuments and symbols of this era were exhibited to praise and celebrate the foundation of the Mexican state (Brading 2001: 522).

In the past 200 years, archaeology and nationalism have been twisted (Diaz-Andreu and Champion 1996: 21). By looking at the examples provided above and the systematic use of institutions such as museums, it can be argued that the relationship between nationalism and archaeology is unavoidable and natural (Kohl and Fawcett 1995: 3). It is also essential to notice that this relationship is not necessarily corrupt (1995: 3). Without the influence of nationalism, we would not know how antiquarianism would have developed. What we know is the fact that because of the impact of nationalism, archaeology became a professional discipline (Diaz-Andreu and Champion 1996: 21). Diaz-Andreu and Champion (1996) argue that, “not only can it [archaeology] now survive without nationalist support, but it can [...] turn a self-critical eye on its own development and evaluate its own involvement in 200 years of social and political change [...]” (Diaz-Andreu and Champion 1996: 21). In the following chapter, we will discuss

the case of nationalism and the practice and development of archaeology in Iran in the past 200 years.

## CHAPTER 4 –Nationalism and Archaeology in Iran

Nationalism and archaeology were both imported to Iran; nationalism was introduced to Iranian by the Western-educated Iranian elites during the nineteenth century (Abdi 2001: 52), and archaeology by British and Russian officers during the early 1840s (2001: 53). This chapter will review the emergence of nationalism in Iran during the nineteenth century and discuss the differences between historical and political nationalism. Then, the practice of archaeology in Iran from the late eighteenth century and the way nationalism and archaeology influenced each other, especially in the middle of the twentieth century, to the present, will be discussed. The history of archaeology will be reviewed under three different governments: the second half of the Qajar dynasty (1787-1925), Pahlavi dynasty (1925-1979), and the Islamic Republic of Iran (1979-present). Reviewing the history of nationalism and archaeology in Iran will help us to understand that in Iran, similar to other countries that we discussed in the previous chapter, nationalism has led to the political manipulation of archaeological evidence, and material remains.

### Nationalism in Iran

The first nationalist movement in Iran happened during the early sixteenth century, when in 1501 Ismail I (1487-1524), the founder of the Safavid dynasty (1501-1736), declared the Twelver sect of Shia Islam as the official religion of the newly-formed state (Amanat 2017: 33, Savory 1980: 27). In this regard, Shia played an

important role in creating a new ethnoreligious identity among Iranian people (Savory 1980: 29). Safavid raised when the Ottoman Empire (1299-1922) in West Asia and North Africa was the most powerful empire in the Islamic world (1980: 29). Roger Savory in his book *Iran Under the Safavids* (1980) argues that proclaiming Shia as the official religion in Iran helped the Safavids to create a separate Iranian Shia political identity and to build a centralized, powerful state (1980: 29).

Nationalism started being used as a tool for political actions during the Constitutional Revolution of 1906-1909, came of age during the Oil Crisis, and matured in the Islamic Revolution of 1979 (Ansari 2003: 16). Venessa Martin explains that in the nineteenth century, Iran witnessed the beginning of a process of change which transformed the country “from a traditional feudal society into a modernized and centralized state” (Martin 1989: 1). The modern Iranian nationalist movements started during the late nineteenth century and showed its results during the Constitutional Revolution of 1906-1909 with the establishment of Iran’s first parliament (Katouzian 2004: 14, Martin 1989: 1). Kamyar Abdi (2001) suggests that Iranian nationalism can be studied in two broad categories: historical and political (Abdi 2001: 52).

The focus of political nationalism is not ancient Iran (Abdi 2001: 52). Political nationalists might use the history of Iran for their goals, which for the most part include freeing contemporary Iran from foreign influences (2001: 52). Majid Sharifi (2013) argues that the modern Iranian nationalism “has been a struggle for freedom from Western domination by embracing the Western political organization of life in the

modern, territorial state” (Sharifi 2013: 1). The most significant example of political nationalism is the famous Mosaddeq era. Mohammad Mosaddeq (1882-1967) was the prime minister of Iran from July 1952 to August 1953, is known to be one of the most nationalistic figures of the Iranian political history (Katouzian 1990, 262). Mosaddeq opposed oil agreements and concessions to Britain and the Soviet Union, and finally in March 1951 nationalized Iranian oil to guarantee Iran’s freedom and independence. Homa Katouzian in his book *Musaddiq and the Struggle for Power in Iran* explains that Mosaddeq wanted “freedom and independence, the rule of law, democracy, and modernization based on cultural realism and the people’s consent” (Katouzian 1990: 267).

Historical nationalism, as Abdi (2001) argues, is only tangentially related to politics in Iran and is directly about the past (Abdi 2001: 52). The primary goal of historical nationalism is to glorify the past and the culture of ancient Iran (2001: 52). As mentioned in the previous chapter, Trigger (1984) argues that when the focus of studies is on the historical period, the situation usually gets complicated (Trigger 1984: 359). Iran tends to glorify the pre-Islamic era when it had a secular and nationalist government but de-emphasize this era and focus more on Islamic period when the government was in favor of a pan-Islamic orientation (1984: 359). However, the history of Iran shows that historical nationalism is “swift to advocate its agenda whenever politics provides a fertile environment” (Abdi 2001: 52). As we will discuss later in this chapter, Iran experienced this situation under Reza Shah Pahlavi (r. 1925-1941), who was the founder of the

Pahlavi dynasty, whose career directly affected both nationalism and the development of archaeology in Iran (2001: 58).

### **Archaeology in Iran**

Archaeology and nationalism were both introduced to Iranians during the second half of the Qajar dynasty (1787-1925) (Abdi 2001: 53). The development of Iranian archaeology can be studied under the three different governments: the Qajar dynasty (1787-1925), Pahlavi dynasty (1925-1979), and the Islamic Republic of Iran (1979-present).

Despite the changes in power, Dezhmkooy and coauthors (2015) argue that the Iranian archaeology “has not experienced many transformations during the last 150 years” (Dezhmkooy et al. 2015: 52) because Iran has always had dictatorial regimes (2015: 52). Homa Katouzian, in his article *State and Society Under Reza Shah* (2014) argues that the Iranian government has always been separated from society (Katouzian 2014: 13). As a result of this situation, Iranian revolutions have been rebellions of the society against the unjust, arbitrary ruler “in the hope of replacing him with a just one” (Katouzian 2014: 14). In this regard, Katouzian believes that in the history of Iran we can witness the general pattern; a cycle of an arbitrary rule-chaos-arbitrary rule (2004: 14). Because of this issue, the government has always formed and designed the kind of research that archaeologists can conduct and the methods they can use to organize their work (Dezhmkooy et al. 2015: 52).

In this regard, from the beginning to the present time, Iranian archaeology has always had a political nature and as Dezhmakhoo and co-authors argue, dependent to Iran's foreign policy (Dezhmakhoo et al. 2015: 52). The primary sponsor of archaeological projects in Iran during the Qajar dynasty was France due to its good relationship with the Crown. When Pahlavis were in power, the United States and the United Kingdom were close friends of the state and sponsored the archaeological research. After the Islamic Revolution of 1979, the situation was different; during the first twenty years of the Islamic Republic, not many foreign archaeologists conducted archaeological field research in Iran, however, with more open policies during the 1990s, scholars from other countries received permission to study in Iran. From 2005, with the rise of radical Islamic groups, archaeology faced new limitations (2015: 52).

#### **Nationalism and Archaeology in Iran: Qajar Dvynasty (1787-1925)**

Archaeology and nationalism were both introduced to Iranian during the second half of the Qajar dynasty (1787-1925) and have had a profound impact on the formation of the Iranian identity and historical consciousness (Abdi 2001: 53, Ansari 2012: 16).

From the mid-eighteenth century, Iran became an interesting destination for European tourists and scholars because of its archaeological remains, especially those related to Ancient Achaemenid Persia (Biglari 2012: 8). For a long time, European scholars were trying to find the historical foundation of the myths and tales of their classical literary, especially the Bible; which led them to Mesopotamia and Persia (2012:

16). Based on these myths and narratives, Western historians started searching in Persia with interest in excavating “the truth or otherwise of Ancient Achaemenid Persians” (Ansari 2012: 16).

In the nineteenth century, Iran had severe social and economic depression under the Qajars and gradually turned into a buffer zone between the British and Russian empires (Abdi 2001: 53). Both states had mutual interests (including archaeology) which led to the arrival of British and Russian officers in Iran (2001: 53). Austin Henry Layard (1817- 1894), a British archaeologist, historian, politician, and diplomat, was one of these officers who traveled in Iran (1840-42) to collect information for the British government to prevent Russia from drawing Persia away from the influence of Britain (Layard 1887: 9). On his journey in Iran, Layard observed archaeological sites in Persia and noted them in his travel account (Niknami 2000: 11).

But perhaps the most important discovery of European scholars was the work of a British officer named Henry Rawlinson (1810-1895) in the 1830s (Ansari 2012: 16, Harari 2015: 298). Rawlinson was fluent in Persian and was sent to Iran to help the Shah of Iran train his army. Meanwhile, he traveled around the country and one day saw the Bisotun Inscription of Darius I (r. 522-486 B.C.E) on a cliff in the Zagros Mountains (Harary 2015: 298). The inscription was written in cuneiform script in three languages: Old Persian, Elamite, and Babylonian; however, nobody could read it (2015: 299). Rawlinson (1848) copied the inscription from 1836 to 1841 and finally deciphered the Old Persian part of the inscription (Harary 2015: 299). His translation of Bisotun

Inscription was published in the *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society* in 1848 and 1849 (Rawlinson 1848: 1-349).

In 1875, based on the translated cuneiform, George Rawlinson (1812-1902), the younger brother of Henry Rawlinson, published his book *The Seven Great Monarchies of the Ancient Eastern World*; the first modern history of ancient Iran from the time of Median to the Sasanian period (Rawlinson 1882). The translations of the cuneiform, several books, and articles about the ancient history of Persia, and other archaeological developments helped European scholars to legitimize the historical tales from the Bible and other classical authors (Ansari 2012: 17).

The reign of Nasir al-Din Shah from 1846 to 1896 witnessed significant changes in Iran, including the rise of nationalism and the beginning of archaeological excavations (Abdi 2001: 53). Iranian interest in archaeology was mostly limited to treasure hunting and antiquarianism. Unfortunately, the lack of knowledge and appreciation for the historical and cultural value of archaeological sites led to much destruction (2001: 53). Looking for antiquities was a common hobby among wealthy Iranians, including Nasir al-Din Shah himself. Nasir al-Din Shah was interested in collecting ancient coins and participating in the so-called *tala-shuyi* (gold-washing) which was a method of excavation. The interest of the Shah in antiquity gradually went beyond the excavations. In 1871, under Nasir al-Din Shah's order, one section of Golestan Palace in Tehran turned into a museum called the *Shahanshahi* (king of kings) (Khandaniha 2017,

Ma'soumi 1977: 201). He also decided to give permits to foreigners to dig in Iran and take away the archaeological artifacts from Iran (Niknami 2000: 12).

The first conventional excavation in Iran was conducted by a British politician, William Kennett Loftus (1857) from 1850 to 1852 (Abdi 2001: 54, Loftus 1857: 287, Niknami 2000: 11). Loftus was a geologist in the Turko-Persian Frontier Commission, a body which was established to fix and determine the border between Iran and the Ottoman Empire (Curtis 1993: 1, Niknami 2000: 11). Loftus visited Susa, which was identified as Biblical Shushan and conducted excavations for two years (Niknami 2000:11). Loftus explains:

“The discoveries made at Shush, during the progress of the Frontier Commission, are equally interesting in a biblical, as in a historical sense, for they identify, beyond the reach of cavil, the exact position of “Shushan the palace,” where the events recorded in the book of Esther took place, and settle many difficult questions connected with the topography of Susa, and the geography of the Greek campaigns in Persia, under Alexander the Great and his successors” (Loftus 1857: Vii).

In his book, *Travels and Researches in Chalder and Susiana* (1857), Loftus explains that when he visited Susa, the ruins had never been surveyed before (Loftus 1857: 287). One of the most significant discoveries of his excavations on the Susa acropolis and the central part of the mound was the Great Hall of Columns at Susa from the time of the Achaemenids (Loftus 1857: 365-370).

Following the excavation of Susa by Loftus, the first significant step toward the development of archaeology in Iran in the late Qajar period began with the French excavations at Susa (Abdi 2001: 54, Biglari 2012: 8, Niknami 2000: 12). In 1882 Marcel

and Jean Dieulafoy requested the government of Iran to excavate Susa. Through the influence of Dr. Tholozan, Nasir ad-Din Shah's French physician, they received permission and ran their archaeological project from 1884 to 1886 at Susa. All the artifacts they found were sent to the Louvre Museum in Paris (Abdi 2001: 54). Unlike most archaeologists, Dieulafoy (1844-1920) liked to study architecture and was less interested in museum objects. His aim was to complete the excavations of the great columned hall, which was identified by Loftus (Amiet 2011). However, in 1886, the Iranian government did not renew the permit due to the destructions that French caused and the fact that Dieulafoys ignored the concession and sent all their findings to France (Abdi 2001: 54).

In 1889, the French government invited Nasir ad-Din Shah to Europe to show him the new Persian exhibition at the Louvre (Abdi 2001: 54). However, their real intention was to expand their archaeological projects at Susa on a larger scale (2001: 54). Nasir ad-Din Shah who always wanted to travel to Europe, accepted the invitation, visited the exhibition, and in 1895, one year before his assassination, once again under the influence of Dr. Tholozan, gave French the right of archaeological excavations in Iran (2001: 54). Based on this new treaty, the Shah of Iran gave French archaeologists an exclusive excavation right to all of Iran except for sacred places like mosques, shrines, and the tomb of Daniel (Niknami 2000: 12). According to this concession, all gold and silver materials belonged to the Shah of Iran, other objects should be divided between Iran and

France, and the French government had to pay 10,000 *Toman* (Iranian currency) to the King to return his generosity (2000: 13).

Two years later, in 1897, the French founded the *Délégation Scientifique Française en Perse* (French Scientific Delegation in Persia) and named Jacques de Morgan (1902) as the director of this institution (Abdi 2001: 54, Niknami 2000: 13). In 1900, motivated by the large number of eye-catching discoveries at Susa, under the reign of Mozaffar ad-Din Shah (r 1896-1905), the French concession was renewed and continued for sixty years, giving all archaeological objects found in Susa to France, and only gold and silver objects would remain for the Iranian government (Abdi 2001: 54, Ma'soumi 1976: 4-6, Niknami 2000: 13). This monopoly gave the absolute control of archaeology in Iran to French archaeologists, and no one was allowed to conduct excavations in Iran, except with French permission until 1927 (Niknami 2000: 14). We should keep in mind that, even though French removed valuable archaeological artifacts and sent them to France, de Morgan and his successors brought the basic excavation methods to Iran and introduced Iranian to the idea of archaeology (Kohl 1998: 228, Niknami 2000: 15).

The Constitutional Revolution of 1906 was a turning point in Iranian history. The leading supporters of this movement were: 1) the clergy, who realized that the new system would tacitly support secularism; 2) the merchants, who were satisfied with the outcome of the revolution, and 3) the intellectuals, who were the only group with strong nationalistic feelings and no experience in political movements (Martin 1989: 35).

During the last years of Qajar dynasty (1900-1925) Iran was almost a British semi-protectorate. However, the coup d'état of 1921 by Seyyed Zia ad-Din Tabatabai (1889-1969) and Reza Khan (1878-1944) was the beginning of a new era for Iranians and Iranian nationalism (Abdi 2001: 56, Abrahamian 1982: 118, Ghani 1998: 182).

In 1922, one year after the coup, a group of nationalist elite established *Anjoman-e Asar-e Melli* (the Society for National Heritage) in Tehran (Nasiri-Moghaddam 2014: 130). According to the declaration, this society was founded to “enhance public interest in ancient knowledge and craft; and to preserve antiquities and handicrafts and their ancient techniques” (*Asas-nameh-ye Anjoman-e Asar-e Melli* 1922: 1). Their goals were 1) to build museums and libraries in Tehran, 2) to ensure the proper recording of all remains and artifacts that were known as national heritage, and 3) to accurately record and register all antiquities which were in possession of the government and the national organizations (*Asas-nameh-ye Anjoman-e Asar-e Melli* 1922: 17-45).

Hassan Pirnia (1933), Mohammad Ali Foroughi (1901), and Nosrat ad-Dowleh Firuz Mirza (1971) were the three influential nationalist figures who founded the Society for National Heritage. It is important to know that the influence of these nationalist figures and intelligentsia, accelerated the nationalistic programs of Iran (2001: 57).

The Society also organized several conferences and invited scholars such as the German archaeologist Ernst Herzfeld (1879-1948) and the American Art historian Arthur Upham Pope (1881-1969). Both Herzfeld and Pope gave many lectures for the Society

and emphasized the importance of preserving historical monuments and their role in shaping the identity of a nation (Nasiri-Moghaddam 2014: 130).

### **Nationalism and Archaeology in Iran: Reza Shah Pahlavi (1925-1941)**

Reza Khan, who was from a low-income family and the son of a small landowner, accumulated enough wealth during his reign to become known as the wealthiest man in Iran (Abrahamian 1982: 137). He was a strong nationalist who used the pre-Islamic empires as a model of a powerful state and the foundation of Iranian national identity (Aryan et al. 2015: 4, Martin 1989: 103). Reza Khan (later Reza Shah) “made his way up the military ranks to a general in the Cossack division of the Iranian army” (Abdi: 2001: 57).

The transformation from Reza Khan to Reza Shah was steady and slow (Abrahamian 1982: 118). In this transformation, Reza Khan managed to suppress all opposition on the way to become Shah (Katouzian 2004: 23). In February 1921, he became the Army Commander, and in May 1921, he removed Seyyed Zia (another critical person in the coup of 1921) and became the War Minister (Abrahamian 1982: 118). In the next few months, he consolidated his power over the military, replaced British and Swedish officers with his Cossack colleagues, and defeated all anti-government movements including religious guerrillas (1982: 118).

Very soon, Reza Khan came to be known as a strongman, who promised to save Iran from the desperation and crisis (Amanat 2017: 389). Reza Khan had the support of

the majority members of the Majlis (parliament), many journalists, middle and upper-class young people, and young and foreign-educated men, all because of his nationalistic spirit (Abrahamian 1982: 120, Katouzian 2004: 23). On October 1925, with the overwhelming majority of the fifth Majlis of Iran, Qajar dynasty abolished, and Reza Khan became the new Shah of Iran (Abrahamian 1982: 120, Amanat 2017: 446). During the twenty years of his reign, Reza Shah renewed Iranian autonomy, decreased the influence of foreigners, supported the flourishing of industrialization, and modernized the military and industry (Abdi 2001: 58).

One of the primary goals of Reza Shah was to satisfy the nationalists, who were his main supporters and likely influenced by European nationalism (Dezhamkhooy et al. 2015: 55). These Iranian nationalists had a particular interest in Persian civilizations like the Achaemenids (Abdi 2015: 55, Aryan et al. 2015: 4). On the other hand, Reza Shah was indifferent to religion and believed that *ulama* (Muslim clergies) were the reason for backwardness in Iran (Chehabi 2004: 225). To suppress the *ulama* and to distance from an Islamic regime, Reza Shah aimed 1) to glorify the pre-Islamic history especially Achaemenid and Sasanian empires, and 2) to glorify Zoroastrianism as the original religion of Iran (Amanat 2017: 473). Amanat (2017) explains that tracing of Persian to ancient times “went hand in hand with renewed interest in Zoroastrianism as the indigenous religion of an authentic past, and archaeology further buttressed such claims” (Amanat 2017: 473). In this regard, his career was directly involved with archaeology and affected the development of archaeology in Iran (Abdi 2001: 58). In this process,

works of the German archaeologists and philologist Ernest Emil Herzfeld (1879-1948) greatly helped in the understanding of pre-Islamic Iran (Amanat 2017: 473).

As mentioned before, the Society for National Heritage organized many conferences and invited scholars such as Herzfeld and Arthur Upham Pope (1881-1969) to deliver speeches related to history and culture of Iran (Nasiri-Moghaddam 2014: 130). On one occasion, in August 1925, Herzfeld delivered a speech in French and outlined the importance of preserving archaeological monuments:

“Those who consider preserving national remains should also take into account the question of excavations and discovery of antiquities, because important historical documents and fine treasures of antiquities are buried beneath the Iranian soil. Arrangements for excavations should therefore complement the preservation of national heritage, and the ensuing results should be exhibited in a National Museum to encourage public interest, so that Iranians can take advantage of them in their present technological development in order to revive and appreciate their civilizations” (Herzfeld 1973, Quoted in Nasiri-Moghaddam 2014).

In another occasion, on 22 April 1925, Arthur Pope gave a lecture about “The Past and Future of Persian Art” in English, translated into Persian for the audience (Moghaddam 2014: 130). Reza Khan (few months before becoming the Shah), some members of the government, parliament, and the Society for National Heritage were among the attendance (2014: 130). In this lecture, Pope presented a survey of Iranian art from the Achaemenid to Sasanian era and Islamic times and stressed the cultural, artistic, and spiritual contribution of Iran to world civilization (Abdi 2001: 60, Moghaddam 2014: 130). He concluded his speech with this phrase: “Art is a vital necessity of life for the Nation [...] The government and the people together must do everything possible to bring

art again to life in Persia” (Pope 1996). In this talk, he also explained that the kings of Iran have always had a critical role in supporting and protecting arts and crafts and emphasized that a cultural and artistic revival in Iran needs the support of the government (Abdi 2001: 60).

Herzfeld and Pope were both against the French monopoly and with their speeches, promoted the idea among Persian elites that the French monopoly should be terminated (Moghaddam 2014: 130). As a result of their efforts, the French monopoly came up for discussion in the *Majlis* (Parliament) and members of the Iranian Parliament including Hoseyn Ala and Mohammad Ali Foroughi argued that *Majlis* had the right to withdraw from the French concession (2014: 130). When in December 1925 the nationalist Reza Shah became in power, the chance to abolish the French concession became more possible (2014: 130).

Finally, in 1927, under Reza Shah, and during the term of the prime minister, Mohammad Ali Foroughi, the *Majlis* abolished the French Concessions and a few years later passed *Ghanoon-e Atighat* (the Antiquities Law) (Abdi 2001: 59, Dezharkhooy et al. 2015: 55, Niknami 2000: 15). According to the Antiquities Law, the French excavations and studies were limited to Susa while an Iranian representative supervised (Abdi 2001: 59, Moghaddam 2014: 131). Even though the abolition of the French monopoly and the ratification of the Antiquities Law were really important for the development of archaeology in Iran, it is important to remember that historians such as Hasan Pirniya and Mohammad Ali Foroughi have written some of the memorable history

books of Iran which served as textbooks at high school level and in universities (Nasiri-Moghadam 2014: 138).

Another important event of this time was the fulfillment of the delayed goal of the *Anjoman-e Asar-e Melli* (Society for National Heritage); the Iranian government decided to build an archaeological museum and library in Tehran (Abdi 2001: 59). In 1929, when Iran decided to build an archaeological museum and library in Tehran, the Iranian government accepted a French citizen, Andre Godard (1950), to be the director of these projects (Abdi 2001: 59, Ma'soumi 1976: 9, Niknami 2000: 16). Godard started his job from 1929 as the director of *Edar-ye Atighat-e Iran* [the Antiquities Service of Iran]. In 1934, he was replaced by Ali Farahmandi (Abdi 2001: 59). The Godard era in Iranian archaeology was very important and had two significant accomplishments: the publication of the first Iranian journal of archaeology called *Athar-e-Iran* (Antiquities of Iran) and the construction of *Iran Bastan* Museum (National Museum of Iran) in Tehran. The museum was inaugurated in 1937 by Reza Shah (Ma'soumi 1977: 204, Nasiri-Moghadam 2014: 136). One of the most important outcomes of the elimination of the French monopoly was the opening of archaeological excavations to other countries, especially to the United States (Abdi 2001: 59, Niknami 2000:16). Few expeditions were sponsored by the University Museum of Philadelphia, including excavations at Tureng Tepe (1931-1932), Tepeh Hessar (1931-1932), and Ray (1934-1936) (The University Museum Excavations in Iran 1971).

Frederick R. Wulsin in his article *Excavations at Tureng Tepe, Near Asterabad* (1932), explains that by passing the new law, Iran opened its doors to scientific archaeological excavations (Wulsin 1932: 2). Wulsin and his wife's expedition was at Tureng Tepe from 1931 to 1932. In his article, Wulsin states that without the support of the Persian Government his expedition would have been impossible:

“without the cordial assistance of the Persian Government our task would have been impossible. Our thanks are due, in the first instance, to H. M. Reza Shah Pahlavi, to whose enlightened wisdom the opening of Persia to archaeological enterprise is due. We also received much encouragement and help from H. H. Teymourtache, the Minister of the Court. The Ministry of Education, under the able direction of Mirza Yahya Khan Gharagozlou, and its service of antiquities, directed by M. Godard, assisted us in every way possible in the execution of our task” (Wulsin 1932: 2)

Another important expedition after the termination of the French monopoly was the excavations at Persepolis (Niknami 2000:18). Persepolis has always been a popular attraction for foreign travelers and scholars (Abdi 2001: 59, Schmidt 1953: 3). In 1931, the excavations at Persepolis was initiated by James H. Breasted (1865-1935), the founder and director of the Oriental Institute of the University of Chicago, and Ernst Herzfeld was the first field director of the Persepolis project (Schmidt 1953: 3).

Herzfeld's most notable achievement was the discovery of the great sculptured stairways of the eastern front of the Apadana and Council Hall in November-1932 (1953: 3). In 1933, during the third season of excavation, the courtyard between the Apadana and the Throne Hall was cleared, and many cuneiform tablets were found in the northeastern remnants of the Terrace fortification (1953: 3). Toward the end of 1934, due

to some administrative issues, Herzfeld resigned, and Erich Schmidt (1953) replaced him (Abdi 2001: 60, Schmidt 1953: 3). The expedition of Persepolis ended in fall 1939, after the outbreak of World War II (Schmidt 1953: 3).

Reza Shah was a strong supporter of archaeological excavations at Persepolis (Abdi 2001: 60, Nasiri-Moghadam 2014: 132, Sami 1976: 213). He visited the site four times (Sami 1976: 221). He visited the site for the first time as the Minister of War in 1922 before the beginning of excavations. During this visit, Reza Khan was fascinated by the ruins of Persepolis and at the same time was disappointed by the neglect of the site (1976: 213). After this visit, he commented that “we should build a wall around Persepolis, so we could prevent more damage from happening to the site, we really have to do something about this site” (Abdi 2001: 60).

After his second visit in 1928, Reza Khan talked about the glory of this site and ancient Iranian monarchs:

“History tells us about the splendor of ancient Iran. In the magnificent ruins of Persepolis one can witness this splendor without historians’ bias, the ruins speak for themselves and tell you the glory of ancient Iranian monarchs.

When I saw the structures of Persepolis, I was moved by those colossal monuments, but seeing them [in such impaired state] deeply depressed me. I was nonetheless delighted [to learn] that such great kings have ruled Iran and left these magnificent remains. Patriotism and national pride should be embedded in every Iranian soul” (Quoted in Eskandari-Khoyini 1956: 72).

After the beginning of the excavations at Persepolis, Reza Shah visited the site two more times (Sami 1976: 223). He had a close friendship with Herzfeld, and during his third visit, he personally ensured that the project would run smoothly (Nasiri-Moghadam

2014: 132). His fourth and last visit was in March 1937 with the Crown Prince Mohammad Reza (Schmidt 1953: 4). Reza Shah spent one day at the site, examined all the excavated materials, and praised the work done at the site (Nasiri-Moghadam 2014: 132, Sami 1976: 223).

After 1939, under the direct order of Reza Shah, archaeological excavations at Persepolis continued by *Edare-ye Bastanshenasi-e Iran* (the Archaeological Service of Iran) under the supervision of Hossein Ravanbod (four months in 1939), Isa Behnam (1939-1940), Mahmoud Rad (1940), Ali Sami (1941-1959), and Akbar Tajvidi (1968-1976) (Sami 1976: 226).

A few other excavations during the reign of Reza Shah in Iran are:

- the first aerial reconnaissance in western Iran at Istakhr, sponsored by the Oriental Institute of the University of Chicago, by Schmidt, from 1935-1937 (Schmidt 2017),
- excavations at Tall-e Bakun, sponsored by the Oriental Institute in 1932, under Alexander Langsdorff (Oriental Institute of the University of Chicago date: N/A),
- expeditions at Qasr-e Abu Nasr, sponsored by the Metropolitan Museum of Art in 1932 and 1933-34, under Joseph. M. Upton (Yates 2018),
- the Sino-Swedish project at Shah Tepe in 1933, under True J. Arne (Arne 1945),
- the French expeditions at Tepe Giayn from 1931 to 1933, under Georges Contenau and Roman Ghirshman (Contenau and Ghirshman 1933), and

- the French expeditions at Tepe Sialk from 1933 to 1937, under Roman Ghirshman (Ghirshman 1938).

All of these expeditions carried out in cooperation with the Iranian Antiquities Service, which was under the direction of the French expert, Andre Godard (Nasiri-Moghadam 2014: 133).

One of the most important steps in the development of archaeology in Iran during Reza Shah was the establishment of the first Department of Archaeology at the University of Tehran in 1937 (2001: 62). Two of the early instructors at the department of archaeology at the University of Tehran, who played an essential role in promoting Iranian nationalism were Mohammad Sadeq Kia (1920-2002) and Ebrahim Pourdavoud (1885-1968) (Abdi 2001: 62). Kia was the first professor of Middle Persian at the University of Tehran; later with some other nationalist published the *Iran Koudeh* series which were mostly promoting Iranian chauvinism (2001: 62). Pourdavoud, who was a more moderate nationalist, was the first professor of ancient Iranian culture and languages (Abdi 2001: 62, Amanat 2017: 481).

As mentioned earlier, Reza Shah had a secularizing agenda and was interested in Zoroastrianism and revival of the ancient Iranian memories (Amanat 2017: 481). The nationalist movement that Reza Shah was supporting, marginalized the experience of Iranian Shi'ism and portrayed it as an unfortunate history of Iran (2017: 483). For example, the role of Shi'ism in the rise of Safavids and its role in shaping the identity of Iranians was downplayed (2017: 483). Also, displays of rituals such as Moharram

mourning with banners, flags, and other symbols were banned (2017:483), and the dress code was used as a powerful tool to transform Iranians into members of a Westernized society (2017: 478). In 1925, after his coronation, Reza Shah adopted the pre-Islamic solar calendar using Zoroastrian names for months and promoted this calendar as the primary calendar in the country over the Islamic lunar calendar (Kestenberg Amighi 1990: 228). Shortly before his coronation, Reza Shah chose the name Pahlavi (an ancient pre-Islamic language) as his last name (Abdi 2001: 63). In 1934, under the order of the Shah, the name of the country officially changed from Persia to Iran, which means the land of Aryans. The government explained that the previous name (Persia) was associated with Qajars and referred to only the province of Fars, whereas the new name (Iran) revoked the glory of ancient Iran and signified the birthplace of the Aryan race (Abarahamin 1982: 143).

As discussed earlier in this chapter, the Iranian nationalism falls into two categories: historical and political. Reza Shah was a secular nationalist and supported the historical nationalism to glorify the past and the culture of ancient Iran (Abdi 2001: 52). The examples that we just discussed above are proofs of what Trigger (1984) argues about historical nationalism in Iran:

“in some countries, where the emphasis of archaeology is on the historical period, the situation is more ambiguous, In particular, Egypt and Iran tend to emphasize the glories of pre-Islamic times in periods when nationalistic and relatively secular politics prevail, but de-emphasize them in favor of the Islamic period when political movements favor a pan-Islamic or (in the case of Egypt) a pan-Arab orientation” (Trigger 1984: 359).

These events in Iran coincided with “advanced post-war archaeology in the Near East, in particular in Mesopotamia, a growing national feeling among various nations of the Near East [...] (which) resulted in changes in the antiquities laws in the most parts of the Near East, especially in Iraq” (Niknami 2000: 15). However, Baram argues that the case of the search for roots in pre-Islamic Iran by Reza Shah was different from similar attempts in any Arab regime (Baram 1990: 427). First, for Iranian territorial nationalism, there was no other political option, and Reza Shah Pahlavi completely ignored the idea of pan-Islam as a practical political alternative. Second, when Arabs were trying to find local civilizations that were both pre-Islam and pre-Arab, they faced the problem of language rupture, however, in Iran due to the preservation of the Persian language, Iranian did not experience this problem (1990: 427). For example, the famous book of *Shahnameh* (977-1010 C.E) by Ferdowsi (940 -1020) in which the author narrates the imperial pre-Islamic history, had a crucial role in creating a “sense of unbroken historical continuity” (Baram 1990: 427). In this regard, Iranian people were familiar with the ancient history of Iran and did not have any negative feelings about it (1990: 428).

Beside history and archaeological remains, another tool that Reza Shah used for nation building was language (Zurcher 2004: 110). John Perry (2004), professor of Persian studies, in his article *Language Reform in Turkey and Iran*, discusses the language reforms in Iran under Reza Shah and in Turkey under Ataturk (2004: 238). He explains that the first language reforms of Iran and Turkey happened in the nineteenth century, with the aim to simplify the legal and administrative language (2004: 239). Later

in the twentieth century social and political reforms and changes in the field of language emerged from the military in Turkey and Iran (2004: 241).

Reza Shah aimed to purify the Persian language from its foreign words (Arabic, Turkish, and Mongolian) because he believed that these languages were reminders of an alien and embarrassing past for Iranians (Amanat 2017: 473). To achieve this goal, the Pahlavi state and its cultural officialdom tried to standardize the Persian language and chose Persian to be Iran's national language to "homogenize the Iranian population through education, press, and the media" (Amanat 2017: 473). Amanat also explains that highlighting the resilience of Persian language against historical odds, and also its roots in the ancient Persian of the Achaemenids and the pre-Islamic Pahlavi language of the Sasanian period, was another tool for the Pahlavi state and its nationalist supporters to glorify pre-Islamic, ancient Iran (2017: 473).

In this regard, the emphasis moved from Islamic literature to those celebrating ancient Iranian traditions, and even the national anthem song honored pre-Islamic era (Abdi 2001: 63). Ferdowsi's *Shahnameh* became an excellent example for Persian speakers (Perry 2004: 245). Ferdowsi was a Persian poet and the author of *Shahnameh*, the world longest epic poem and the national epic of Greater Iran (*Shahnameh* 2016: 6). In this monumental book, Ferdowsi had consciously avoided using Arabic words. Professor Rezazadeh Shafaq (1895-1971) used *Shahnameh* to encourage Iranian teachers and writers to learn from this example (Perry 2004: 245).

In 1935, Mohammad Ali Foroughi, who was the first prime minister of Reza Shah, convinced the Shah to establish *Farhangestan* (Persian Language Academy) (Amanat 2017: 475, Perry 2004: 247). The goal of this academy was “compiling a list of classical and dialect words and, ultimately, a Persian dictionary, setting rules by which to coin new terms, proposing necessary neologisms, and purging Persian of unsuitable foreign words” (2004: 247). Over the six years, *Farhangestan* proposed equivalents to Arabic, French, and Turkish terms which received public acceptance and became part of the everyday language of Iranians (Amanat 2017: 475).

During the reign of Reza Shah, Iran witnessed economic, industrial, cultural, and educational developments (Abrahamian 1982: 145). For example, due to the ambitious projects, the government budget increased from less than 245 million rials (Iranian currency) in 1925 to more than 4.3 billion rials in 1941 (1982: 148). Niknami (2000) also argues that under Reza Shah Pahlavi, Iranian archaeology developed a lot, methods of practicing archaeology advanced, and “the field moved from enlightened treasure hunting to scholarly competence” (Niknami 2000: 17).

However, by the mid-1930s, Reza Shah became oppressive and unpredictable (Amanat 2017: 293). Most of those who supported Reza Khan to become the Shah were cowed into submission and were replaced by the new generation of technocrats, army generals were only following Reza Shah’s orders and wishes, the *ulama* were demoralized, and the Majlis had no power in making decisions for the country (2017: 293-94).

In 1941, two years after the beginning of the second World War, even though Iran announced to be neutral during the War, suspicious to Reza Shah's real intentions and concerned with the noticeable presence of Germans in Iran, Allied forces occupied the country and forced Reza Shah to abdicate in favor of his crown prince, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi (Amanat 2017: 494, Milani 2013: 93).

#### **Nationalism and Archaeology in Iran: Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi (1941-1979)**

In September 1941, the eldest son of Reza Shah assumed kingship as Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi (Abdi 2001: 65, Milani 2013: 95). Due to the occupation by Allied forces during the Second World War, all the archaeological projects ended, except for excavations at Persepolis which were continued by *Edare-ye Bastanshenasi-e Iran* (the Archaeological Service of Iran) (Abdi 2001: 65). After the war, from 1945, archaeological activities were resumed (2001: 65). For example,

the French returned to Susa in 1946 (Ghirshman 1947), Donald McCrown, a member of the Persepolis team conducted a survey at Ram-Hormuz Plain in Khuzestan in 1946 and 1957 and excavated Tall-e Qasir in 1947 and 1948 (McCrown 1949), and Theodore Burton Brown of Manchester University excavated Goeyp Tepe in 1948 (Brown 1952).

From the end of the Second World War to the early 1960s, Iran witnessed major socioeconomic changes and political movements, some of them directly related to nationalism. Most important was the Anglo-Iranian oil concession, "which led to an

upsurge of Iranian nationalism in the early 1950” (Abdi 2001: 65). This period is famously known as “Mosaddeq era” (Abdi 2001: 65). Mohammad Mosaddeq (1882-1967) was Iran’s prime minister from 1951 to 1953 (Azimi2009: 400, Katouzian 1990, 262). The nationalism that was promoted during this time was political, thus different than the historical nationalism under Reza Shah, which stressed the history and culture of ancient Iran (Abdi 2001: 65). The primary goal of Mosaddeq and his followers was to eliminate the control of the British over Iran’s oil and the influence of foreign forces over Iranian affairs to be able to establish and extend a democratic government (Abdi 2001: 65, Katouzian 1990: 73). Even though Mosaddeq and his nationalist followers were successful in nationalizing the oil of Iran, they failed to overcome the upcoming crisis. The Mosaddeq era ended after the coup of 1953 which was conducted by the CIA agent Kermit Roosevelt (1889-1943) from the American embassy in Tehran (Abdi 2001: 66, Azimi 2009: 455, Katouzian 1990: 188). This coup “put an end to the political nationalism of the Mosaddeq era” (Abdi 2001: 66). Following the coup, Mohammad Reza Shah gradually developed into the absolute ruler of Iran, with little concern for the constitution or the *Majlis* (2001: 66).

The 1960s and 1970s were the culmination of archaeological success and the Explosive Phase in Iranian archaeology (Abdi 2001: 66). When Mohammad Reza Shah was in power, political relationships with the West increased (Dezhamkhooy et al. 2015: 55). As mentioned before, foreign policy has always had an impact on the presence of foreign archaeologists in Iran (2015: 52). As a result, archaeologists from the United

States, Canada, European countries, and Japan started archaeological fieldworks in different parts of Iran (Abdi 2001: 66). For example, from the 1960s onwards, the study of Neolithic Iran received a lot of attention (Niknami 2000:24).

T. Cuyler Young conducted an excavation project at Godin Tepe from 1965 to 1973 (Young 1967), at the same time Stronach dug at Nushijan Tepe (Stronach and Roaf 1978), Claire Goff started to work at Babajan (Goff 1969), and Vanden Berghe was excavating cemeteries of Pusht-i-Kuh in Luristan (Berghe 1971)

In addition to foreign archaeologists, the Department of Archaeology of Tehran University under the supervision of Ezat O. Negahban started to play a more critical role in archaeological research in Iran, by both conducting archaeological projects such as excavations at Marlik burials (Negahban 1963), Pileh Qaleh (Negahban 1964), Haft Tepe (Negahban 1967), and training new archaeology students to serve in the Archaeological Service of Iran (Abdi 2001: 66). Another important event was the foundation of *Markaz-e Tahghihat-e Bastanshenasi* [the Center for Archaeological Research] within *Edare-ye Bastanshenasi-e Iran* [the Archaeological Service of Iran] under Firouz Bagherzadeh (1981) in 1972 and its sponsorship of annual meeting of all archaeologists working in Iran (2001: 67).

As mentioned earlier, under Safavids (1501-1736) Shia Islam became the official religion of Iran (Amanat 2017: 33, Savory 1980: 27). Since this time, the Iranian kingship “was traditionally associated with the Islamic Shari’a, with the king as the defender and protector of Islam” (Abdi 2001: 67). However, in the early 1960s, Ayatollah Khomeini

who later became the leader of the Islamic Revolution of 1979, disagreed with this ideology and started confronting Mohammad Reza Shah. As a result, Mohammad Reza Shah distanced himself from the religious institutions and tried to legitimize his sovereignty by emphasizing and glorifying the pre-Islamic era (2001: 67). Very similar to his father, Mohammad Reza Shah stressed on nationalism and pre-Islamic values and tried very hard to present himself as the latest king in a long line of great Iranian kings from his favorite king, Cyrus the Great (2001: 67). Reza Shah chose Pahlavi as his last name to link himself to the pre-Islamic era; Mohammad Reza Shah added the historical title *Aryamehr* (the light of the Aryans) (2001: 67).

The state endeavor to glorify the pre-Islamic era to marginalize Islam made both Muslim clergy and the liberal Islamic thinkers to criticize Mohammad Reza Shah and his policies (Abdi 2001: 67). Ali Shari'ati was one of the first critics of Pahlavis and leading supporters of the Islamic state and ideology (Dabashi 2008: 106). Dabashi (2008) describes Shari'ati as the furious revolutionary among the ideologues of the Islamic Revolution (Dabashi 2008: 106). Shari'ati's main concentration was on "Shi'ism," and his aim was transforming Shi'ism from what he considered "a religious tradition with multiple sets of historical traits into a political ideology of monolithic revolutionary proportions" (Dabashi 2008: 110). In one of his speeches at Hoseini-ye Ershad in Tehran Shari'ati encouraged Iranian to abandon Western and pre-Islamic traditions and return to their Shia roots:

“The experts may know a great deal about the Sasanians, the Achaemenids, and even the earlier civilizations, but our people know nothing about such things. Our people do not find their roots in these civilizations. [...] our people remember nothing from this distant past and do not care to learn about pre-Islamic civilizations. Consequently, for us to return to our roots means not a rediscovery of pre-Islamic Iran, but a return to our Islamic, especially Shiite, roots” (Shari’ati 1967, Quoted in Abrahamian 1982: 470).

However, none of these criticisms stopped Mohammad Reza Shah from glorifying Iran’s pre-Islamic history (Milani 2013: 406), with himself “at the zenith of imperial Iran” (Abdi 2001: 68). Following this plan, in 1967, he celebrated his official coronation (Milani 2013: 402), and four years later, in 1971, he organized the famous so-called “The Show of Shows” ceremony; the celebration of the 2500th anniversary of the foundation of the Persian empire by Cyrus the Great, the first Achaemenid King (Abdi 2001: 68, Dezhankhooy et al. 2015: 55). Abdi (2001) believes that this ceremony was the most significant abuse of archaeology and ancient history by modern politicians in Iran (2001: 68), and Dezhankhooy and co-authors believe that this celebration was “a turning point in nationalist enthusiasm for archaeological data” (Dezhankhooy et al. 2015: 55).

The idea of this event was suggested in 1958 by Shojaeddin Shafa (1918-2010), who was a researcher, historian, and the Shah’s cultural counselor (Afkhani 2009: 404). The ceremony had different purposes. One reason was to show Iran as a country with great history, art, literature, religions, and culture (Shafa 1971:18). Another aim was to associate Mohammad Reza Shah with Cyrus the Great and Iran’s pre-Islamic monuments (Ansari 2003: 171). Michael Axworthy (2013) explains that the Shah

“wanted to assert the strength and enduring character of Iranian kingship, at a time when monarchy as an institution was menaced by republicanism and communism internationally, and when some in Iran were asserting Islam rather than monarchy as the true center of Iranian identity” (Axworthy 2013: 77).

The Shah believed that monarchy was the ideal form of government and saw Islam as the cause of the country's decline (Milani 2011: 324). Mohammad Reza Shah wanted to use this celebration to show the world the presence of Iran on the international scene and to claim its place as one of the superpowers in the world; a position that he believed belonged to Iran because of its magnificent past. In an interview before the celebration, the Shah said:

“After all, apart from the great warrior-statesman Cyrus, who bequeathed to civilization its first humanitarian code, we contributed to it, also, the prophet Zoroaster, the scientist-philosopher Avicenna, the mathematician-poet Omar Khayyam, the astronomer Biruni, the alchemist Rhazes and the poets Ferdowsi, Sa'di, Hafez and Rumi. Throughout the centuries Persia has stood as a bridge in geographical, historical and cultural exchanges between the great civilizations of Asia and Europe” (Quoted in Davidian 1971: 28).

Political leaders and heads of all governments were invited to the ceremony: one emperor, nine kings, three ruling princes, two crown princes, 13 presidents, ten sheiks, and two sultans attended the ceremony (Kadivar 2002). However, some more observant leaders sent their representors, vice presidents, prime ministers, foreign ministers, or ambassadors. For example, Queen Elizabeth II was advised not to attend the ceremony because the celebrations would probably be insecure; the Duke of Edinburgh, Prince Phillip and Princess Ann represented her instead. Richard Nixon, the President of the

United States had planned to attend, but then sent his Vice-President, Spiro Agnew, amid fears of a terrorist attack (Minali 2013: 407).

Guests were housed in tents designed by a French decorator. The French restaurant, Maxim, provided all food and beverages. On the first day, guests sat on Persepolis platform and watched the Iranian Army parade in front of them, the soldiers dressed as the armies of Iranian dynasties from Achaemenids to the Pahlavi (Abdi 2001: 69). Perhaps the most crucial part of the ceremony was Mohammad Reza Shah's speech before the tomb of Cyrus at Pasargadae. In this speech, he addressed Cyrus with an emotional voice:

“To you Cyrus, Great King, King of Kings, from Myself, Shahanshah (King of Kings) of Iran, and from my people, Hail!

We are here at the moment when Iran renews its pledge to History to bear witness to immense gratitude of an entire people to you, immortal Hero of History, founder of world's oldest empire, great liberator of all time, worthy son of mankind.

Cyrus [,] we stand before your eternal dwelling place and speak these solemn words: Sleep in peace forever, for we are awake and we remain to watch over your glorious heritage” (Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi 1971, Quoted in Shawcross 1988: 46-7)

It is estimated that the show cost between 200 to 300 million dollars, while the average income was around \$500 (Abdi 2001: 69, Milani 2013: 407). The ceremony was followed by massive criticism; on the one hand, some Iranians condemned the ceremony for its expensive costs, on the other hand, others, including Queen Farah Pahlavi (b. 1938) did not like the ceremony because it was more French than Iranian (Abdi 2001: 69). Some other believed Mohammad Reza Shah's attempt to elevate himself to the level

of Cyrus and other great kings of Achaemenids was a humiliation for the Shah and the country.

However, the fiercest criticism was from Ayatollah Khomeini who was in exile in Iraq at that time (Abdi 2001: 69). Ayatollah Khomeini was the leader of the Islamic Revolution of 1979 (Dabashi 2008: 417). The Islamic revolution and Khomeini are two inseparable phenomena; Khomeini was the catalytic voice of the revolution (2008: 417). After the ceremony, on 31 October 1971, Khomeini wrote:

“Are millions of *tumans* (Iranian currency) of the people’s wealth to be spent on these frivolous and absurd celebrations? Are the people of Iran to have a festiva for those whose behavior has been a scandal throughout history and who are a cause of crime and oppression, of abomination and corruption, in the present age?” (Khoemini 1971, Quoted in Algar 1981: 202).

The ceremony was a failure for Mohammad Reza Shah; it brought him neither the international prestige nor the national respect (Abdi 2001: 69). Persepolis ceremony was also an unfortunate event for archaeologists. Dezhamkhooy and co-authors (2015) claim that, even though archaeologists were not involved in this celebration and some of them even condemned it, they were associated with the ceremony by Iranian people (2015: 57). The ceremony “produced a transformation of the celebrated past into negative heritage” (Dezhamkhooy et al. 2015: 57) and damaged the reputation of archaeology (2015: 57).

Less than eight years after the ceremony and only two years after the lavish celebration of the 50th anniversary of the Pahlavi dynasty, “the Revolution of 1979 toppled the monarchy in Iran” (Abdi 2001: 69). During the revolution, the celebration of the 2500th anniversary of the foundation of the Persian empire was frequently mentioned

by the revolutionaries to remind people of despotism and corruption of Pahlavis (2001: 69).

### **Nationalism and Archaeology in Iran: The Islamic Republic of Iran (1979-present)**

The purpose of this study is not to discuss the cause or the outcomes of the Islamic Revolution of 1979, however, as Abdi (2001) argues “it should be stressed that no event in the recent history of Iran transformed the political structure of the country as deeply as the revolution” (Abdi 2001: 69). On January 16, 1979, Mohammad Reza Shah and his family left Iran to Egypt (Milani 2013: 518) and Ayatollah Khomeini (1902-1989), the leader of the Islamic Revolution, returned to Iran from exile on February 1, 1979. On February 11, 1979, after a few days of demonstrations and street fighting between the revolutionaries and the last loyal military troops to the Shah, the Pahlavi government collapsed (Abdi 2001: 70, Bakhash 1984: 51).

As early as 1971, one of the main goals of revolutionaries was the elimination of the monarchy in Iran (Bakhash 1984: 35). After the celebration of the 2500th anniversary of the foundation of the Persian Empire, Ayatollah Khomeini attacked the celebration and said:

“God only knows what disasters the Iranian monarchy has given rise to since its beginning and what crimes it has committed. The crimes of the kings of Iran have blackened the pages of history; it is the kings of Iran that have constantly ordered massacres of their people and had pyramids built with their skulls.... Traditions relate that the Prophet said that the title King of Kings which is born by the monarchs of Iran, is the most hated of all titles in the sight of God. Islam is fundamentally opposed to the whole notion of monarchy.... Monarchy is

one of the most shameful and disgraceful reactionary manifestations” (Khomeini 1972, Quoted in Algar 1981: 202).

The new regime’s anti-monarchical perspective resulted in the demolishing and removal of anything associated with the monarchy; the word “shah” was removed and replaced by “Islam” or “Imam” (Abdi 2001: 70). Even though the people did not change, the imagined community that they formed, and their relationship to the government changed (Van de Ven 2017: 17), and nationalism, as a Western concept, got rejected (Abdi 2001: 70). In this regard, the secular term *mellat* (nation) under a monarchy was replaced by *ommat* (the Muslim community), and Iranian nationalism rejected in favor of a pan-Islamic agenda (Van de Ven 2017: 17). Even Mohammad Mosaddeq, the symbol of Iranian nationalism was discredited (Abdi 2001: 70).

With this restructuring “the heritage of these communities, the chosen symbols within which their histories become focused, preserved and passed on would also need to be politicized to fit the new rhetoric” (Van de Ven 2017: 17). Van de Ven argues that since the Islamic revolution, the concept of Iranian identity and Iranian heritage have revisited and changed based on the needs of the government and its relationship with the population (2017: 17). For example, in an attempt, the government tried to stop the Nowruz festival which is the celebration of the spring but gave up when confronted with the serious objection by the people (Abdi 2001: 70).

The pre-Islamic monuments were not the source of national pride anymore, but “symbols of monarchical tyranny imposed on the masses” (Abdi 2001: 70). After the

revolution, even though museums, archaeological, and historic sites were in danger, there is no evidence to confirm vandalism (Abdi 2001: 70). The regime's tactic was to maintain the pre-Islamic monuments, but to dismantle them without physical damage (Van de Ven 2017: 18).

A great example of this is the Tomb of Cyrus the Great in Pasargad (Van de Ven 2017: 19). As mentioned before, Pahlavi kings were interested in Achaemenids history and had respect for Cyrus. Under Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, extensive archaeological projects were conducted to analyze the structure of this monument (2017: 20). In 1971, Mohammad Reza Shah celebrated of the 2500th anniversary of the foundation of the Persian empire at Persepolis and chose Pasargad, the Tomb of Cyrus, as the stage for his remarkable speech about the Persian Empire and Cyrus the Great. By doing this, he aimed to end any association between Islam and Achaemenid sites (2017: 20).

After the Revolution, the Tomb of Cyrus was never directly harmed; however, the new regime has been allowing the monument to wear away slowly (Van de Ven 2017: 20). Even though the site was added to the World Heritage List, in 2003, the government approved the Sivand dam project (Van de Ven 2017: 20). The Sivand dam is three miles away from the Tomb of Cyrus, and before its construction, some critics believed that the dampness would affect the ruins. Some archaeologists and scientists agreed with this theory, too; however, Hasan Fazelei, the director of *Pajooheshkad-ye Bastanshenasi-e Sazman-e Miras Farhangi* [Archaeological Research Institute of the Department of

*Cultural Heritage*] emphasized that the Sivand Dam will not threaten Pasargad (Omidvar 2007). Despite the criticism and protests against the plan, the project continued, and the dam was opened in 2007 (Van de Ven 2017: 20).

Interestingly, sometimes the Islamic regime has recognized the pre-Islamic sites to unite its diverse population (Van de Ven 2017: 20). For example, during the time of the Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988), when the government was in need of national pride beyond that of Islamic martyrdom, the pre-Islamic era was used to bring unity and national pride among the various religious and ethnic groups (2017: 20). Even under the conservative presidency of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (in office. 2005-2013), the pre-Islamic heritage was used for the benefit of the government. In 2010, the Cyrus Cylinder was brought to Iran for four months. During the opening ceremony of this exhibition, Ahmadinejad called Cyrus as a “predecessor of the great enlightened Islamic leaders of Iran” (Van de Ven 2017: 20). He also said:

“The Cylinder reads that everyone is entitled to freedom of thought and choice and all individuals should pay respect to one another. The historical charter also underscores the necessity of fighting oppression, defending the oppressed, respecting human dignity, and recognizing human rights. The Cyrus Cylinder bears testimony to the fact that the Iranian nation has always been the flag-bearer of justice, devotion and human values throughout history” (Ahmadinejad 2010, Quoted in Barzegar 2010).

However, today once again those celebration related to the pre-Islamic era are not welcomed by the government (Van de Ven 2017: 20). One particular example is the birthday of Cyrus which has continued to challenge the government. This public festivity

held at the site of Cyrus' Tomb is easily transformed into an anti-government protest (2017: 20).

Abdi (2001) argues that archaeology in Iran suffered from "the self-serving demonstrations by the Pahlavi government" (Abdi 2001: 70). The nationalists' policies of Pahlavis and their emphasis on Achaemenids, as well as the 2500th celebration at Pasargad, damaged the image of archaeology and made Iranian cultural heritage, especially those related to Achaemenid, into negative heritage (Dezhamkhooy et al. 2015: 57). Under the reign of Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, the government misused archaeology and pre-Islamic history for political ends (Marashi 2008). Dezhamkhooy and coauthors argue that because of this matter, "research on historical periods would inevitably face nationalist issue" (Dezhamkhooy et al. 2015: 57). The authors believe that this is the reason that archaeological investigation focused on the prehistoric era; to avoid the risk of confronting political nationalists (2015: 57).

On the other hand, Niknami (2000) believes that the study of the archaeology of the pre-Islamic era developed because first, the Islamic art and archaeology in Iran have never been problem-oriented. The second reason is related to the lack of archaeologists who study this era, and finally because the pre-Revolution governments did not encourage archaeologists to study the Islamic period (Nikanmi 2000: 37). The lack of attention to Islamic era and the emphasize on pre-Islamic period made the new regime to see archaeology as nothing more than "a pseudoscience in service of the court to glorify

despotism and justify royal oppression of the masses, both inherently against the new belief system” (Abdi 2001: 70).

The consequence of this idea was marginalizing archaeology and assaulting archaeologists ((Dezhamkhooy et al. 2015: 57). The Department of Archaeology of Tehran University was closed temporarily during the Cultural Revolution (1979-1982) (Abdi 2001: 70). There was also an attempt to close the department or incorporate it with the History Department. However, professors of archaeology objected this matter and as a result, the Department of Archaeology remained open (2001: 70).

A country that was once a center for archaeological research, sent all foreign archaeologists home and closed its doors to them for a long time, “adopted a self-imposed archaeological isolation following the revolution” (Abdi 2007: 227). Even though the Archaeological Service and the Office for Protection and Preservation of Historical stayed active, the archaeological excavations were limited during the first few years after the Islamic Revolution (2001: 70). One year after the Revolution, the eight-year war between Iran and Iraq broke out, and all archaeological fieldworks became stagnant until the end of the war in the late 1980s (Rouhani 2010).

It took ten years for the Iranian archaeology to recover (Abdi 2001: 71). In 1985, the government of Iran formed Sazman-e Miras-e Farhang-ie Iran [the Iranian Cultural Heritage Organization (ICHO) to cooperate with the Center for Archaeological Research, Center for Traditional Crafts, Center and Museum of Ethnography, Office for Historical Remains, Iran Bastan Museum, Office for the Protection of the Cultural Heritage of the

Provinces, Office of Palaces, National Center for the Protection of Iranian Antiquities, and Office of the Golestan Palace Endowments (2001: 71). In April 1988, the Majlis (parliament) confirmed the constitution of ICHO. According to this constitution, ICHO was entrusted with responsibilities over recovery, protection, preservation, and introduction of archaeological and historical remains to the public (Sazman-e Miras-e Farhang-ie Iran 1990: 1). To achieve these goals, the ICHO organized four deputies: 1) Deputy for Research, supervising Offices for Archaeological, Ethnographic, Folk Art, and Epigraphic Research; 2) Deputy for Protection and Preservation of Archaeological and Historical Remains; 3) Deputy for Introduction and Education; and 4) Deputy for Administration and Finance (Sazman-e Miras-e Farhang-ie Iran 1990).

Abdi (2001) argues that the foundation of ICHO in 1985 was the beginning of a new era for archaeology in Iran (Abdi 2001: 71). Establishing offices in centers of all provinces, registering archaeological sites in different parts of the country, forming local societies in rural areas to protect archaeological sites, preventing clandestine excavations and looting are some of the outstanding accomplishments of ICHO (2001: 71).

Since 1990, archaeological projects have increased in Iran, including large and small scale national projects involving survey and excavation (Abdi 2001: 71). Excavations at Ziwiye and Changebar (an Iron Age Cemetery) in 1994 under Nosrat Motamedi (Motamedi 1995), excavations at Qom near Tehran in 1994 under Sadeq Malek Shmirzadi (Malek Shmirzadi 1994), and excavations at Islam Abad from 1997 to

1998 under Fereydon Biglari and Kamyar Abdi (Biglari and Abdi 1999) are some of these projects. Foreign archaeologists also started working in Iran again. For example, a joint ICHO-Oriental Institute of the University of Chicago conducted surveys in north-western Fars in 1995 (Abdi 2001: 71).

Today, in addition to the Department of Archaeology at the University of Tehran (B.A., M.A., and Ph.D) several other universities are teaching archaeology including Shahid Beheshti University (B.A, and M.A degree), Art University of Shiraz (B.A), Tarbiyat-e Modarres University (M.A. and Ph.D. degree) and Bu-Ali University in Hamedan (B.A.). ICHO also has its training center (B.A. degree) (Abdi 2001: 72).

The curriculum of Tehran University (M.A) includes courses such as Archaeology of Achaemenids, Archaeology of Parthians, Archaeology of the Medes, Archaeology of Sasanian, Islamic Archaeology and Art, Archaeological Methods, Museum Studies, and master's Thesis (Department of Archaeology at the University of Tehran 2018). The curriculum of Shahid Beheshti University (M.A) also offers these courses: Archaeological Theories, Archaeological Methods, Research Planning for Archaeology, Paleolithic Archaeology, the Art of Pottery: Prehistoric Iran, Civilizations of Prehistoric Iran, Master's Thesis, ... (Department of Archaeology at Shahid Beheshti University 2018). However, further details about course syllabus or archaeological excavations under these universities cannot be found on universities' official websites.

Most of the archaeology students try hard to get a job in cultural heritage institutions because only through these institutions they can get permission to work in

Iran (Dezhamkhooy et al. 2015: 53). Following the law of antiquities after the Islamic Revolution, any archaeological activities including surveys and excavations must receive permission from the government (Sazman-e Miras-e Farhang-ie Iran 1990: 3). Based on this law, the government can decide to permit private organizations or individuals to practice archaeology in Iran (1990: 4). Also, anyone who practices archaeological excavations, even at their property, without legal permission, will be fined or sentenced (1990: 4). Dezhamkhooy and co-authors claim that due to government's control on archaeological activities, any personal interest or sympathy for opposition groups may prevent someone from researching in Iran (Dezhamkhooy et al. 2015: 53).

If the project is directly under the government, all materials and data belong to the government, too (Sazman-e Miras-e Farhang-ie Iran 1990: 3). If private organizations organize the project, then ten items belong to the government and the government can choose among them; the rest belong to the private organization (1990: 3).

Dezhamkhooy and co-authors call the Iranian government totalitarian and categorize the Iranian archaeologists into four groups: 1) those archaeologists who have never said "no" to the power and conduct those projects that the government asks them to do; 2) the majority of Iranian archaeologists, who keep quiet in the totalitarian environment; 3) archaeologists who were sent to Europe and the United States to continue their education during the 1960s, who started translating archaeological sources when they returned to Iran; and 4) opposing archaeologists who face harsh reactions from the power (2015: 62).

Today, in some Islamic states such as the Islamic Republic of Iran, the study of pre-Islamic era is developing along with the study of Islamic era (Kohl et al. 2007: 16). The ICHO is responsible to protect pre-Islamic monuments which belonged to Sasanian, Parthian, and Achaemenid and Islamic sites. Kohl and co-authors argue that “there is no contradiction now between the religious and the national pre-Islamic heritage” (Kohl et al. 2007: 16). Both pre-Islamic and Islamic are the sources of national pride, and both have been used as sources of income from tourism. However, the time related to the Pahlavi kings has always been condemned by the current regime, “including [their] fascination with Iran’s ancient past (2007: 16).

Archaeology is a marginalized field in Iran, a victim of ideological violence, and an instrument to apply force (Dezhamkhooy et al. 2015: 66). It is entangled with the government’s policies; the government decides the time, scale, and form of studies and projects (2015: 66). Dezhamkhooy argues that Iranian archaeologists cannot change the world; the only thing they can do is to change the world around themselves and their relationship with the world (2015: 67).

## CHAPTER 5 – CONCLUSIONS

Archaeology and nationalism have an undeniable and natural connection (Kohl and Fawcett 1995: 3) to the extent that Trigger (1984) claims “most archaeological traditions are probably nationalistic in orientation” (Trigger 1984: 358). In other words, nationalism has served as the leading force behind the study of antiquity and the emergence of archaeology as a discipline (Mazariegos 1998: 376, Meskell 2002: 282).

Nationalism is a cultural production and a political principle (Spencer et al. 1990: 283). Following the French Revolution of 1789, modern nations were created, and national histories were published in books, museums, art, and primary education (Sommer 2017: 171). This study claims that the creation of a shared history was essential for strengthening national identity. Since then, nationalists and politicians have actively and consciously used material culture to construct a specific past for their modern nations.

The careful study of the history of the relationship between nationalism and archaeology in France, Germany, Spain, Turkey, Iraq, Israel, and Iran shows that the past, whether real or fictional, has played and continues to play a central role in promoting nationalism and political sentiments around the world (Abdi 2008: 28, Abu el-Haj 2001: 161, Trigger 1984: 358). The case studies in this paper help us understand how nationalists have claimed a suitable history based on ethnic (e.g., Israel) or territorial (e.g., Nazi Germany) continuity. These examples prove that if states, whether secular

(e.g., Turkey) or religious (e.g., Islamic Republic of Iran), feel the need, they immediately use the past and archaeological remains to advance their political plans.

Nationalism and archaeology are both Western concepts that were imported into Iran mainly by Western-educated Iranians and Western officers residing in Iran during the nineteenth century (Abdi 2001: 53). In the nineteenth century and early twentieth century, average Iranians did not have the knowledge to comprehend these concepts. Wealthy Iranians, including Nasir al-Din Shah (r. 1846 to 1896), were interested in treasure hunting as a hobby and did not consider material remains worthy of scholarly investigations. Their lack of knowledge, expertise, and appreciation for the historical and cultural value of archaeological sites led to the destruction of these sites. On the other hand, nationalism was a reaction to the arrival of foreigners. The Constitutional Revolution of 1906-1909, nationalization of the Iranian oil industry in 1951, and the Islamic Revolution of 1979 are some of the significant results of nationalist movements in Iran in the twentieth century (Ansari 2003: 16).

The secular agenda of Pahlavi kings (1925-1979), their interests in the pre-Islamic era, and their appreciation for Zoroastrianism and ancient Iran marginalized Iranian Shi'ism and portrayed it as an unfortunate history of Iran (Amant 2017: 483). The growing relationship between nationalism and archaeology along with a focus on ancient Iran led to an old habit of Iranians: looking for external scapegoats when confronted with internal struggles.

Having grown up in Iran and having been educated in Iranian schools, I was taught that Iranians are great because of their rich history and culture. We are great because of Cyrus the Great (598-530 BC), Ferdowsi (940-1020), Rumi (1207-1273), Abbas the Great (1571-1629), and Karim Khan Zand (1705-1779). We learned that Alexander (336-323 BC) was not great, but a ruthless king who burnt Persepolis and that Genghis Khan (1162-1227) was not the brave founder of the Mongol Empire, but a barbaric ruler who killed Iranians and burnt Persian books to destroy our heritage. However, the case of the Arab conquest of Iran in 651 is a unique example. In history classes in Iran before the Revolution of 1979, the Muslim conquest was portrayed as the most embarrassing event of Iranian history. Thirty years after the Revolution, I learned in my high school history class that this same event is considered the most notable event in Iran's history!

Nationalism and the way it has influenced and misused the past has taught every Iranian to be proud of their great history without trying to build a better future. We learned to blame Greeks, Arabs, Mongols, British, Russians, and Americans for the decline of Iran in different periods of history. Today, there are many Iranians who blame the Trump Administration for the economic turmoil in Iran.

On the other hand, we were never taught how to fix the internal issues on our own. We always seem to expect a hero to appear and solve the problem. I believe this is the reason that Iran has always had an arbitrary ruler. As was discussed in chapter four, the history of Iran shows a general pattern: a cycle of an arbitrary rule-chaos-arbitrary

rule (Katouzian 2014: 14). The Iranian government has always been separated from society, which has led to revolutions that have aimed to replace the previous arbitrary ruler with a just one (Katouzian 2014: 14).

Even though these old habits still exist among average Iranians, the new generation has started to investigate the internal problems that have led to the decline of Iran in the recent past. The social media movement, known as My Stealthy Freedom, is an excellent example of a change of habit in Iran. The campaign was commenced in 2014 by the exiled Iranian journalist, Masih Alinejad, and is a movement against compulsory hijab in Iran (Garcia 2018). Though the Facebook page, Iranian women are encouraged to share photos of themselves without a veil and to tell stories about how the law of compulsory hijab has affected their lives. The goal of this movement is to show the dissatisfaction of the Iranian women with this law (Garcia 2018).

I firmly believe that students of the Persian language, archaeology, history, and anthropology are responsible for raising relevant questions to this matter. For example, it is crucial for archaeology students to look at the 2500th anniversary of the foundation of the Persian empire by Cyrus the Great and analyze this ceremony as an internal scapegoats which not only failed to bring respect and prestige for the Pahlavis and Iranians but also resulted in a transformation of the celebrated past into negative heritage while damaging the reputation of archaeology.

While I was studying the history of modern Iran, I noticed that the field of historiography is shifting from older perspectives to new ones by acknowledging the

capacity of the people of Iran to change the future of this country. However, based on what Abdi (2001) argues, Iranian archaeology is more resistant to new critical perspectives (Abdi 2001: 73).

Dezhamkhooy and co-authors (2015), Abdi (2001), and Van de Ven (2017) argue that the Iranian archaeology has always been twisted by the government's policies. In this study, the review of the history of the development of archaeology in Iran shows that apart from the Qajar period (1787-1925), in which archaeology was a means to entertain the Shah and a source of income for foreign states like France, archaeology has always served as a political tool in Iran rather than a professional discipline. Dezhamkhooy and co-authors (2015) and Abdi (2001) also believe that archaeology and the study of ancient Iran has suffered the most from the Revolution of 1979.

One can argue that the recently increasing number of archaeological activities along with the growing number of universities offering archaeology refute the claims above. In response, I argue that restricted, or lack of, online access to archaeological data, projects, and archives shows the importance of this field of study for the Iranian government. Also, while researching for this paper, I noticed that in spite of Iran's abundance of archaeological studies, Iran has been omitted or ignored by Western archaeologists studying the history of archaeology. Based on the arguments of Abdi (2001) and Dezhamkhooy (2015), I believe the lack of publications by Western scholars is the result of political bias and not lack of interest in Iranian archaeology.

Another critical problem is the relationship between archaeology and the public. My personal experience shows that most Iranians see archaeology as a useless major – this is largely because it has been a long time since they have heard about any notable discoveries related to ancient Iran. This brings up three questions: first, how many archaeological journals are published in Iran every year? Second, how many archaeological excavations in Iran are related to ancient Iran? And third, how popular is archaeology as a field of study among the younger generation?

In order to answer these questions, more research studies are needed. Specifically, learning about the number of journal publications and details of archaeological projects in Iran after the Revolution of 1979 to the present would help shed light on these questions. I also suggest interviews with archaeology students in Iran and the United States along with active Iranian archaeologists to help expand our knowledge about the sensitivity of this major the government and current job opportunities for archaeologists.

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