

KANT ON INTUITIONAL CONTENT AND THE REPRESENTATION OF
INCONGRUENT COUNTERPARTS

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by

Katie Burkhalter

San Francisco, California

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
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
Dr. Mohammad Azadpur
Professor of Philosophy

KANT ON INTUITIONAL CONTENT AND THE REPRESENTATION OF
INCONGRUENT COUNTERPARTS

Katie Burkhalter
San Francisco, California
2015

In this paper, I raise an objection to Robert Hanna's Kantian Non-Conceptualism thesis. Hanna argues that the existence and representational significance of non-conceptual content is founded in Kant's cognitive theory, and Hanna takes Kant's argument from incongruent counterparts to show this. My objection to Hanna centers on the necessity of, and the necessary role of concepts in constituting, the transcendental unity of apperception, something under which all representations must stand in order to have any significance for me. I argue representational significance is the product of synthesis in accordance with a rule (i.e. a concept). Only a rule can bring unity to both the manifold of representations in an intuition and our consciousness of it, the transcendental unity of apperception. Specifically, I show the representation that represents incongruent counterparts as distinct, the representation of the object as located in space, must be conceptually structured in order to bring about this necessary unity of consciousness, the thoroughgoing identity of the self in all possible representations.

I certify that the abstract is a correct representation of the content of this thesis.



Chair, Thesis Committee

5/14/2015

Date

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1. Introduction

In “Kantian Non-Conceptualism,” and other recent papers, Robert Hanna argues that the existence and representational significance of essentially non-conceptual mental content is founded in and supported by Kant’s cognitive theory, and Hanna takes Kant’s argument from incongruent counterparts to show this.¹ In this paper, I raise an objection to Hanna’s Kantian Non-Conceptualism thesis. I argue that according to Kant, non-conceptual content cannot have any representational significance. Representational significance is the product of synthesis in accordance with a rule (i.e. a concept). Only a rule can bring unity to both the manifold of representations in an intuition and our consciousness of it, the transcendental unity of apperception. My objection to Hanna centers on the necessity of, and the necessary role of concepts in constituting, the transcendental unity of apperception, something under which all of my representations must stand in order to have any significance for me.

Kant’s argument from incongruent counterparts is that in order to correctly represent an incongruent counterpart the representation must have a spatial orientation. This is accomplished by representing the object along with a representation of space, a necessary and a priori condition for every mental representation generated by the sensibility. This spatial representation accounts for the form of intuition: the particular shape of an object of experience is just a representation of a determinate space in space. Hanna claims that in the *Transcendental Aesthetic* Kant details the non-conceptuality of this representation mostly on the grounds that space is not a concept in accordance with which we structure our representations of objects in space.² Hanna generalizes

¹ This thesis is common to Hanna (2008) “Kantian Non-Conceptualism”, (2005) “Kant and Non-Conceptual Content”, and (2011) “Beyond the Myth of the Myth: A Kantian Theory of Non-Conceptual Content”.

² See Hanna (2005): 253

from this that intuitional content has representational significance independently of the understanding, our faculty for using concepts.

In contrast, I argue that representations are only significant for us in virtue of synthesizing a representation with respect to a concept functioning as a rule for how a representation ought to be structured if it is to be such a representation for me. It is the unity in the intuition imparted by the rule that at the same time makes possible the synthetic unity of apperception, our consciousness of the representation as such a representation. It is for precisely this reason that Kant holds the synthetic unity of apperception to be something under which every representation must stand in order to be a representation for me (B138).

Kant distinguishes two aspects of synthesis, figurative and intellectual, that together account for the synthesis of the intuition (B152). Figurative synthesis is what determines the form of intuition, the representation of the object in space. This amounts to the combination of the manifold only as it *appears* in intuition, e.g. the shape of the triangle. Intellectual synthesis involves recognizing the unity in the intuition under a concept, so that the shape represents a triangle for me.

On Hanna's reading, figurative synthesis is accomplished independently of all concepts; it is a function of the imagination belonging to sensibility. The sensibility for Hanna is not entirely passive, characterized by receptivity alone, it is only "relatively passive" with respect to the understanding. For Hanna, the sensibility has the power to deliver spatially structured and oriented intuitions to the understanding for their recognition under concepts.³

³ See Hanna (2005): 249

The orientation of the representation is accomplished by representing the object as a determinate space within the infinitely ordered magnitude that is space. Space as an *a priori* intuition is represented along with the representation of the object as in space, but can only be represented through the manifold of sensation synthesized accordingly in the intuition. This is the function of figurative synthesis.

On the surface Hanna's account of this synthesis is a plausible reading of the footnote to B161, "the unity in this a priori intuition belongs to space and time, and not to the concepts of the understanding." But reading it this way creates certain inconsistencies for interpreting Kant's claim about the relation between representational significance and the synthetic unity of apperception.

Representations are only significant for us by means of synthesizing the representation with respect to a rule (i.e. a concept) for how a representation ought to be structured if it is to be such a representation for me. The unity in the intuition imparted by a rule makes possible the synthetic unity of apperception, our consciousness of the representation as such a representation.

I argue, because space is represented as an infinitely ordered magnitude (B40), how we represent objects as in space is by representing them as a limit on that magnitude (B39). Thus despite our not having a concept for space, the representation of objects as in space are conceptually structured in accordance with the concept of a magnitude. This is Kant's point in the Axioms of Intuition titled in part, "All appearances are, as regards their intuition, extensive magnitudes," and his claim in it is that "the unity given in the manifold of sensible intuition is thought in the concept of a magnitude, i.e. appearances are all magnitudes," (B203).

I will touch on the distinction between the discursive function of concepts in thought and the non-discursive function of concepts as rules in intuition. The distinction is that in thought conceptual content is articulated, whether that content is propositional or containing part of what figures in a proposition, but in intuition it is not.

The presentation of my thesis will run as follows: first, I will present Hanna's argument for the existence and representational significance of essentially non-conceptual content within Kant's cognitive framework; second, I will raise an objection to this reading of Kant on the grounds that representations are significant for me only in virtue of the synthesis of the representation in accordance with a rule, because this unity of the rule in the representation constitutes at the same time the unity of my consciousness of it; finally, I will provide an alternative conceptualists reading of the representation that makes the representation of incongruent counterparts possible, which I think overcomes certain inconsistencies in Hanna's reading.

The overarching theme of this paper is to give an account of Kant's notion of intuition (*Anschauung*). An intuition is, in its most basic sense, a combined manifold of representations, i.e., sensations. As combined, an intuition contains in it many representations, by which I do not mean the many representations in a manifold, but single determinate complex representations that result from the determination of the manifold in synthesis. All intuitions must be synthesized and all synthesis must be in accordance with a rule, because only a rule can bring unity to the manifold of representations in an intuition and also our consciousness of it. The particular unity the intuition has by representing the object as in space corresponds to the unity of rule by which we would represent the object as object for ourselves: the rule is found in the particular unity the intuition has as a result of figurative synthesis in accordance with the concept of a magnitude.

2. Hanna's Argument for Kantian Non-Conceptualism

In this section, I will first present Hanna's argument for the existence and representational significance of non-conceptual mental content from Kant's argument from incongruent counterparts. Then I will detail Hanna's account of the non-conceptuality of intuitional content; how figurative synthesis functions independently of the understanding.

Incongruent counterparts are two objects whose forms or shapes are effectively mirror images of each other and such that it is impossible to super impose one onto the other. These objects include our two hands and oppositely spiraled snails. Incongruent counterparts are philosophically interesting because the non-identity or correct representation of them depends on our subjective experience of the object in space. Without this oriented representation the two objects are indistinguishable descriptively. Kant's argument from incongruent counterparts is that all rational thinking requires an intuition based orientation in order to be grounded adequately, meaning all sensible representations must carry with them, so to speak, an egocentrically oriented representation of space.

Hanna argues that Kant's argument from incongruent counterparts demonstrates the existence and representational significance of non-conceptual content. I have simplified the relevant features of Hanna's argument into the following construction:

1. There is no purely descriptive difference between incongruent counterparts
2. Therefore there is no conceptual difference between either of my two hands and its incongruent counterpart.

3. But I can directly perceive the exact and real difference between the shapes of my two hands.

4. Therefore, essentially non-conceptual content exists and is what represents the difference between two incongruent counterparts. (Hanna (2008): 55-6; Hanna (2011): 358-9)

Hanna argues that because we do not represent the difference between incongruent counterparts using only concepts, the difference is represented by something entirely non-conceptual.

Kant's point here is the perception of incongruent counterparts as distinct requires something beyond only concepts, namely intuition with its immediate relation to the object through sensation. Kant shows intuition does this work only by standing under the formal conditions of space and time. The question here is whether standing under those formal conditions requires the understanding or if it is delivered through the sensibility alone. If those formal conditions do not require the understanding, if they are generated in the sensibility, the representation that represents incongruent counterparts as distinct is non-conceptual, and this demonstrates the existence and representational significance of non-conceptual content.

The form of intuition represents the spatially oriented shape of the object. It is generated in what Kant describes as figurative synthesis; a synthesis of the representations (i.e. sensations) delivered through the sensibility into the form of sense. Kant also calls this the form of appearance. Figurative synthesis is what orders our sensations so that they are in accordance with the formal conditions of space and time through which objects can first appear for me. Form of intuition just means the particular way the manifold of representations are ordered and combined, i.e. synthesized. Through this order and combination the object is represented as in space. This is in contrast to a formal intuition, the combined manifold, which is a representation of space.

Kant characterizes the sensibility as “the capacity (receptivity) to acquire representations through the way in which we are affected by objects,” (A19/B33). The effect of the object on the sensibility is sensation. The appearance of this sensation is its matter, but it is the form of appearance that allows the manifold of appearance to be intuited as ordered in certain relations (B34/A20). The form of appearance is something that cannot be given in sensation *a posteriori*, and so must be ready in the mind *a priori*.

This characterization of the sensibility leads one to think of it as a strictly passive faculty, but Hanna argues that the sensibility is not *entirely* passive, only *relatively* passive. According to Hanna, the sensibility, functioning along with the imagination, which belongs here to sensibility alone and not the understanding, has “a mental power for spontaneous synthesis,” (Hanna 2005: 249). Hanna reasons the sensibility, through the power of the productive imagination, executes figurative synthesis giving form to the manifold of appearance. This is likely motivated by Kant’s description of appearance as the undetermined object, and the role of understanding as determining (B152), by which Kant means determining the object to be thus in accordance with a rule, and also in the way Kant writes, “Space is not a discursive, or as we say general concept of relations of things in general, but a pure intuition,” (A24, B31). A concept is by definition a mark that can be common to several things (A320), but space is uniquely singular. So, it is that we do not represent the determinate space an object is in by recognizing the object in a general concept of space, but rather the form of intuition gives this representation of the object as in space.

Kant describes how experience is made possible by a three-fold act of synthesis. This is otherwise said, the representations of objects of experience are generated in a three-fold act of synthesis. The first fold, the synthesis of apprehension in the intuition, brings the manifold of sensations under the formal conditions of space and time. This is accomplished by ordering the

manifold of appearance into certain relations. In bringing the manifold into certain relations, what was once a series of unrelated representations is now unified in a single representation. The particular order and combination of the manifold amounts to the form of appearance, and the unified representation is an intuition. The sensibility accounts for the receptivity of the matter of appearance and the imagination orders the manifold into certain relations. Hanna thinks this function of the imagination is independent of the understanding, but I argue the understanding necessarily provides a rule according to which we order and combine the manifold. On my reading the first fold, the synthesis of apprehension, simultaneously involves the second, reproduction in the imagination, and third, recognition in the concept, but on Hanna's reading this involves only the second and not the third.

The main problem I see with Hanna's reading of figurative synthesis is that without a concept acting as a rule for determining the form of appearance, if it is to appear in such a way for me, the arrangement the imagination imparts on the manifold has no representational significance for me. The imagination orders the manifold of sensations, but without a rule that determines the particular order of the manifold, telling me what this arrangement is supposed to represent, the representation has no significance for me. This means non-conceptual content (if there is any for Kant at all) is only the manifold of sensations, representing nothing for me. Hanna does not recognize the unique and essential unifying function of a rule in intuition, through which alone a representation is significant for me, because it is crucial to the Kantian Non-Conceptualism thesis that non-conceptual content is representationally significant and not purely sensory (Hanna 2005: 250).

Hanna's argument for Kantian Non-conceptualism is that because there is no general concept of space acting as rule by which we synthesize the manifold of appearance in accordance

with the formal condition of experience, space, this particular spatial aspect of experience is essentially non-conceptual. So, not only is the particular representation that represents incongruent counterparts as distinct non-conceptual, the basic structure of intuition is essentially non-conceptual. The representational significance of the intuition is demonstrated in recognizing the difference between our two hands.

According to Hanna, the representation of objects as in space is a case in which our cognitive capacities outstrip our conceptual capacities (Hanna 2005: 248). The claim is that for every type of cognitive content there is a corresponding cognitive capacity. There are some cognitive capacities that are not determined by conceptual capacities, such as our capacity to represent the spatial orientation of intuitions and so this is non-conceptual cognitive content. This is a characteristic move for defenders of non-conceptualism.⁴

Hanna's claim is that non-conceptual cognitive content in the contemporary sense is identical with intuitional cognitive content in Kant's sense. So, in Hanna's view, a reading of Kant's intuitional content can help to articulate the semantic structure and psychological function of our contemporary understanding of non-conceptual content.

To review, Hanna's Kantian Non-Conceptualism thesis states that the existence and representational significance of essentially non-conceptual content is founded in Kant's cognitive theory, and Hanna takes Kant's argument from incongruent counterparts to show this. The argument is that the difference in incongruent counterparts is represented by the spatially oriented form of the intuition, a representation of the object in space. Hanna argues this representation is not determined by conceptual capacities because this representation is not generated in

⁴ See Evans' *Varieties of Reference* (1982) and the tradition that follows.

accordance with a concept of space; thus, it must be determined by our non-conceptual capacities. Hanna's claim is that the manifold of sensation in intuition can represent the difference between incongruent counterparts independently of the understanding, and Hanna generalizes this claim to say that the basic structure of intuitional content is non-conceptual.

3. Objection

3.1. Introduction to Objection

My objection to Hanna's Kantian Non-Conceptualism thesis, on the existence and representational significance of non-conceptual content within Kant's cognitive theory, centers on the necessity of, and the necessary role of concepts in constituting the transcendental unity of apperception. Kant's transcendental argument for the principle of unity of apperception is it must be the case that for each of my representations I can attribute that representation to myself, a subject which is the same for all of my representations: a single subject of experience persisting through time. Kant's claim is that apperception, the consciousness I have of an object by representing it for myself, must have a necessary unity since all my representations must be grounded in a thoroughgoing identity of the self in all possible representations. This thoroughgoing identity of the self grounds my representations by holding fixed the function of a rule in synthesis and hence also the significance a representation has for me as a result of that synthesis.

The important point for Kant, which I argue Hanna's Kantian Non-conceptualism thesis overlooks, is that all representations must stand under this unity of apperception in order to have

any significance for me. Hanna's thesis is about non-conceptual content having representational significance, but here I argue a representation is only significant by standing under the unity of apperception, which is brought about only in the act of representing, synthesizing the representation in accordance with a rule. This is my argument generally. More specifically, I argue the particular representation that represents incongruent counterparts as distinct, the representation of the object as in space, must be conceptually structured (i.e. synthesized in accordance with a rule) in order to establish the thoroughgoing identity of the self in all possible representations.

The unity of apperception is brought about in the act of representing, but an intuition can only represent if it is synthesized in accordance with a rule. It is this unity of a rule in an intuition that at the same time constitutes the unity of consciousness of it, and thereby gives the representation significance for me. No representation can have significance without standing under the unity of apperception, and the unity of apperception is brought about in the representation only by unifying the representation in accordance with a rule for how the representation ought to be ordered and combined if it is to be such a representation for me.

The unity of consciousness is just in the unity of rule in the representation. I unify my consciousness of the triangle by affecting a synthetic unity in the representation of a triangle in accordance with a rule (here a rule associated with the concept of triangle) for how representation ought to be ordered and combined if it is to be a representation of a triangle for me. This synthesis accounts for our consciousness of the object as an object (e.g. as a triangle), by uniting the representation in accordance with a rule associated with the general concept triangle.

However, Hanna is not interested in this sort of representation, nor am I. It is not that we recognize the difference between our two hands, as incongruent counterparts by recognizing that one is a left-hand and the other is a right-hand, though this may be happening concurrently. We recognize the difference between the two forms in the spatially oriented shape of the object. This is the representation of the mere appearance of the object, the shape of the object conceived of independently of our concept of the object. That is: what represents incongruent counterparts as distinct is the representation of the object just as in space, represented in the form of intuition. A representation of space is given along with the form of intuition, which just means the form of intuition is unified in such a way that corresponds with the unity of space—space represented as an infinitely ordered magnitude, and so singular. The representation of the object within the infinitely ordered magnitude, our representation of space, accounts for the spatial orientation of the intuition. This is what represents incongruent counterparts as distinct.

The unity of apperception, the thoroughgoing identity of the self in all possible representations, what grounds all representations and makes their representational significance possible for me, is brought about in the representation of the object as in space and time. Space and time are pure intuitions, single determinate representations given along with the manifold of representations (i.e. sensations). The manifold of representations is combined in one representation, only by being combined in one consciousness of it in accordance with a rule that determines how a representation ought to be combined if it is to be such a representation for me. Nothing can combine many representations into one except for the unity of a rule. That all empirical representations are represented as in one unique space for one consciousness accounts for the thoroughgoing identity of the self in all possible representations, but this singular representation of space is only possible by uniting the manifold of representations in a rule. In

this case it is the rule associated with the concept of a magnitude, the rule that determines how a representation ought to be ordered and combined if it is to represent a magnitude for me. So, in contrast to Hanna's account of Kant's argument from incongruent counterparts, I show that the representation that represents incongruent counterparts as distinct must be conceptual in order to bring about a thoroughgoing identity of the self in all representation, the transcendental unity of apperception.

Hanna argues the representation that represents incongruent counterparts as distinct is non-conceptual precisely because the representation is not determined in accordance with a concept of space; yet, this representation has significance for me because clearly I do recognize my two hands as distinct. I argue that if this representation is non-conceptual it could not stand under the unity of apperception, through which alone a representation has any significance for me. My argument rests on Kant's larger argument that if the representation of objects as in space is not structured conceptually, we could have no pure intuition of space in which the unity of apperception is grounded.

I will begin the presentation of my argument by describing the necessary role of concepts, functioning as rules, in constituting the synthetic unity of apperception. Here, I will focus on the consciousness we have of an object by representing it as an object (e.g. as a triangle), synthesis in accordance with the concept of the object. I will then go on to argue that concepts must also have a similar unifying role in the representation of the mere appearance of the object, the representation of the object just as in space, conceived of prior to the concept of the object as object. This must be so in order to bring about the transcendental unity of apperception, the thoroughgoing identity of the self in all possible representations.

3.2. The Function of Rules in Constituting the Transcendental Unity of Apperception

The claim to be argued is that all representations must stand under the synthetic unity of apperception in order to have any representational significance for me. Representational significance is a product of the unity in the intuition. The unity in the intuition is the unity of the consciousness of the synthesis of the manifold of representations in the intuition, all of which is instituted through the function of a rule for how a representation ought to be ordered and combined if it is to be such a representation for me. I argue nothing can bring unity to the representation and my consciousness of it except for a rule, and so no representation can have any significance for me except for through a rule.

The synthetic unity of apperception is the consciousness we have of an object by synthesizing a representation of it. Kant writes, the synthetic unity of consciousness is brought about by “my adding one representation to another and being conscious of their synthesis,” (B134). In synthesis we order and combine the manifold of representation into a single determinate representation. Nothing is combined except through the unity imparted in the manifold by a rule. In giving unity to the manifold of representation we give unity to our consciousness of it. Kant’s familiar example of this is in counting:

If in counting, I forget that the units that now hover before my sense were successively added to each other by me, then I would not cognize the generation of the multitude through this successive addition of one to the other, and consequently I would not cognize the number; for this concept consist solely in the consciousness of the unity of the synthesis. (A103)

The concept of counting, meaning here the representation of counting, is the successive addition of one to another. I emphasize the two-part function of succession as a rule by which I add one to another: the rule brings unity to my addition of one to another by determining that adding one to another *is counting*. The representation of counting is only in my consciousness of this unity in the addition of one to another. The addition of one unit to another does not amount to a *single* representation *of counting* except in the unity of a rule that describes: the successive addition of one to another is counting. My consciousness of the representation is brought about in the synthesis of the representation. However, this synthesis, the determinate combination of many representations into one, is only possible in accordance with a rule. Only a rule can give unity to the manifold of representations (i.e. sensations) in an intuition, because only through a rule does the manifold represent.

The manifold is unified in a representation, and my consciousness of it is unified in representing it. The determinate representation is a product of both the unity of rule that determines the manifold and the consciousness that is unified in determining it. Representational significance is in the relation between the unity of the representation and the unity of apperception. This relation is constituted just in the unity of rule.

We could imagine the synthesis of a manifold without the unity of a rule as Hanna does in his account of figurative synthesis. Here I argue this would give only an unrecognizable heap of representations brought together in one consciousness, but representing nothing for it. It is even misleading to speak of one consciousness that is not unified in a rule. Consciousness is unified in synthesizing the manifold of representations. Synthesis involves more than just the putting together of representations. It is an act of combination, bringing many representations

together in one. This is accomplished only if there is something among the many representations to unify them.

The three straight lines of a triangle, for example, represent nothing for me precisely because I have not combined them in such a way that represents a triangle for me. Even if the way the lines are heaped together looks like a triangle, there is nothing in the heap of lines that makes them necessarily represent a triangle for me. The significance of the representation is what the representation makes necessary for me, and the necessity of the representation is just in the co-synthesis of intuition and consciousness of it in accordance with a rule. To this effect, Kant writes:

Hence we say we cognize the object if we have effected synthetic unity in the manifold of intuition. But this is impossible if the intuition could not have been produced through a function of synthesis in accordance with a rule that makes the reproduction of the manifold necessary a priori and a concept in which this manifold is united possible.

(A105)

Our concept of the object corresponds to the unity of rule in the intuition. We think of an object through the act of representing it for ourselves, which entails synthesizing the manifold of intuition in accordance with a rule for how the representation ought to be structured if it is to be such a representation for me. The rule accounts for the necessity of the representation and its representational significance for me. It is only in a rule that the manifold is unified in an intuition, and it is only through the unity of our consciousness of the synthesis that we can think of the concept of the representation. Meaning the unity of rule in an intuition is fundamental to our discursive, general concept of the object.

under the synthetic unity of apperceptions. This is because it is only through this synthesis that there can be any unity in the intuition, that the manifold of intuition can be combined in one determinate representation. Every manifold that is given in intuition is determined by the unity of a rule.

Hanna argues that the synthesis of the intuition, where only the form of appearance is concerned, is affected in the sensibility alone, independently of any concepts of the understanding, precisely because here the object is not recognized in a concept. Hanna attributes this spontaneous power for synthesis to the imagination belonging to sensibility. Above I argue, that according to Kant, the unity of rule determines every manifold, and so synthesis in accordance with a rule is determining “and not, like sense, merely determinable,” (B152). Thus, it is an act of synthesis that determines the form of sense (i.e. the form of appearance, the form of intuition) so that it is in accordance with the unity of apperception. Hanna is right that the imagination is the faculty for determining the sensibility independently of any recognition of the object as object, like a triangle. But Kant is clear, “its synthesis of intuition (is) in accordance with the categories,” (B152). In this way the imagination belongs to sensibility in so far as it is first determining sense, but also belongs to the understand in so far as it is determining; the synthesis of the imagination is “an effect of the understanding on sensibility,” (B152). The point here is in order for the synthesis of apprehension to be in agreement with the synthesis of apperception, this same synthesis must be in accordance with a rule. “It is one in the same spontaneity that, there under the name of imagination and here under the name understanding, brings combination into the manifold of intuition, ” (Nothing can be combined except in the unity of a rule.

3.3. The Function of Rules in Constituting the Transcendental Unity of Apperception in the Representation of the Mere Appearance of an Object

I have shown that nothing can unify a representation and our consciousness of it except for a rule. Without a rule the manifold is only an unrecognizable heap of representations that together do not represent anything for me. The rule unifies by determining the representational significance of the manifold, making the representation necessary for me through the co-constitution of the representation and our consciousness of it. In this section, I will show that even in representing the mere form of appearance conceived of independently from the concept of the object, the synthesis must be in accordance with a concept, functioning as a rule, in order to both unify the representation and our consciousness of it. I will go on to argue it is the unity of this representation, that is also the unity of our pure intuition of space, that grounds the transcendental unity of consciousness and makes possible the representation of the thoroughgoing identity of the self in all possible representations.

Kant writes, “this unity of rule determines every manifold,” (A105) and in so far as the mere form of appearance is the ordered manifold of sensation it is necessarily a rule that so determines it. In no other way can the representation stand under the synthetic unity of apperception. This is what Kant means when he writes about the unity of rule that determines every manifold limits it to conditions that make the unity of apperception possible.

We also see Kant express this idea in Section 20 titled “All sensible intuitions stand under the categories, as conditions under which alone their manifold can come together in one consciousness.” The idea here is that the manifold that is given in an intuition necessarily belongs

3.4. The Representation of Objects as Located in Space Must Be Conceptually Structured in order to bring about the Unity of Apperception

At this point I have show that all representations must stand under the transcendental unity of apperception in order to have any representational significance for me, and the unity of apperception is brought about only in synthesizing the representation in accordance with a rule. I show that both our representation of objects as objects, e.g. as a triangle, and also the representation of the mere appearance of the object, the representation of the object just as located in space, must be structured conceptually in order to constituted and also stand under the unity of apperception. Hanna argues the representation that represents incongruent counterparts as distinct, the representation of the object as located in space, is non-conceptual, but I show in this section that it is precisely this representation that must be structured conceptually in order to bring about the transcendental unity of apperception in the strong sense that Kant intended: the thoroughgoing identity of the self in all possible representations.

The representation of the object as located in space is represented in the form of intuition. This is accomplished through representing space along with the intuition of the object of experience. Space is represented as an infinite given magnitude (A25). As a pure intuition, the representation contains in it a manifold of representation, which must be synthesized in accordance with a rule in order that the many representations are combined in one. The rule, which unifies the many representations in one here, is not a concept of space, but of a magnitude, because space is represented as a given magnitude. The unity of this representation of space also gives unity to the form of intuition though which it is represented. So the intuition of the object of experience is consequently first ordered and combined in accordance with the concept of a magnitude. This accounts for the form of intuition and how the object is represented as a

determinate space located in the given infinite magnitude that is our representation of space. So, Hanna was right to say that we do not use a concept of space to synthesize our representations of objects as located in space, but it does not follow from this that the representation is non-conceptual. The representation of space and also of objects as in space must be conceptual because the manifold of representations in an intuition can only be combined in one representation through the unity of a rule.

The unity of rule in the representation is at the same time the unity of consciousness of the representation. It is through this unity of rule in the representation that the representation has any significance for me.

The transcendental unity of apperception is the thoroughgoing identity of the self in all possible representations. The identity of the self in all possible representations is brought about just in the unity of the representation of space because it is precisely this representation that is given along with all representations of objects as in space. The transcendental unity of apperception is grounded in the unity of the pure intuition of space (and time), the necessary and a priori conditions for any representation generated in the sensibility. Hence, I argue it is precisely the representation that represents incongruent counterparts as distinct, the representation of the object located in space, that must be conceptually structured in order to bring about a thoroughgoing identity of the self in all possible representations. It is the unity and identity of space in all possible representations that at the same time unifies our consciousness throughout all of our representations.

Hanna argues that non-conceptual representations can have representational significance. In contrast, I argue that all representations must stand under the transcendental unity of

apperception in order to have any significance for me, and this unity of apperception, the identity of consciousness throughout all possible representations, is brought about just in the synthesis of the representation of objects as in space in accordance with a rule.

4. Response

In the Aesthetic, Kant attributes the unity of the representation of the form of appearance to the sensibility “in order to note that it precedes all concepts, though to be sure it presupposes a synthesis,” (ft.*B161). Kant goes on to say “the unity of this a priori intuition belongs to space and time, and not to the concept of the understanding,” (ft.*B161). What the non-conceptualist read here is that the unity of space imparts unity in the representation of it, which in turn imparts a unity in the form of appearance of an object. Because this unity does not belong to a concept of space, the representation is non-conceptual. But as a composite representation, “it presupposes a synthesis, the synthetic unity of consciousness is found in it,” (ft.* B136). So in the case of the representation of space and consequently the representation of the object in space, understood just as the form of appearance, the synthesis is in accordance with space, which is not a concept: the unity belongs to space.

This response addresses two important points. First, on how we should understand the representation of space. Second, on the distinction between the function of a rule in the representation and the general concept of the object, or other concepts afforded by the intuition. I will discuss each point in turn.

5. On the Representation of Space

The form of appearance accounts for the spatial orientation of the intuition, the representation that represents incongruent counterparts as distinct. This is accomplished by representing space along with the representation of the object. Hanna's argument goes that because we do not have a concept of space in accordance with which to unify the represent of space, this representation is non-conceptual. "Space is not a discursive, or as is said, general concept (...), but a pure intuition, " (A25). Space is not represented through a concept of space, but through the manifold or representation in an intuition that together represent space. The response above showed that Kant intends to understand the unity of this intuition as belonging to space, not to the concepts of the understanding. And Hanna's reasoning goes that as the form of intuition belongs to the pure intuition, its unity, that is the unity in the form of appearance, belongs to the unity of space. There is something to this, but not what the non-conceptualists think it is.

Space is singular and so the unity of space belongs to it. Space is represented as an infinitely ordered series. Kant calls it an extensive magnitude. Representing it this way accounts for the spatial orientation of the intuition; we represent an object with respect to the origin of the extensive magnitude, all sensible representations are egocentric. Each representation in an intuition is one in the infinitely ordered series that is space. In so far as the representation of space is composite, it presupposes a synthesis. My argument above was that all synthesis must be in accordance with a rule in order for the representation to have any significance for me.

To represent space for ourselves, we order the manifold of sensation in an intuition so as to represent an infinite given magnitude. We do this by synthesizing the intuition in accordance

with the concept of a magnitude. This gives both the form of appearance and a representation of space. The unity of space belongs to space in so far as the infinite magnitude is singular, a positive infinity rather than a negative one. I represent space not in generating a magnitude, but by placing limits on a *given* magnitude. The unity in the representation of the object as in space belongs to space in this way, but it is through the concept of a magnitude that the representation of an object first becomes possible, and it is only through the unity of this rule that the manifold of representations in an intuition is combined in one. The singularity of space gives the magnitude orientation, but it is the unity of rule in the intuition that gives a representation of space by representing the intuition as an ordered magnitude. The unity of space cannot give unity to the representation. The unity in the representation must correspond to the unity of consciousness, which is brought about only in our synthesis of the representation in accordance with a rule. "The act that determines the intuition is possible only through the categories," (B202).

6. On the Function of a Concept as a Rule

Kant distinguishes between the function of a concept as a rule for determining the representation of the manifold of intuition and the general concept through which the representation is thought. The understanding, our faculty for using concepts, is our faculty for discursive activity. This is in contrast to the sensibility, our faculty for receptivity. It is a misleading to charge the representations acquired here, sensations, with the capacity to represent. I have just argued above that representational significance is a product of synthesis in accordance with a rule in order to at the same time bring about the synthetic unity of consciousness of the representation. The concept as a rule is the non-discursive counterpart to the general concept

through which the object is thought discursively. “That representation which is prior to all thinking is intuition,” (B132) but intuition, in so far as it contains a manifold of representations in it, is determined in accordance with a rule, so that the unity of apperception, and hence its representational significance, is made possible.

What appears in intuition is, for example, the shape of the triangle (A124), and the triangle is thought about discursively through those predicates, ‘is three sided’, etc., associated with the concept triangle.

Another way to think about this distinction is that the function of the concept in thought is to enumerate what is entailed by the unity of the intuition. Importantly, intuitional content can represent for us, and does so in virtue of its synthesis in accordance with a rule, even in the event that we have no associated general concept, by means of which the content can be made discursive. This representation is simply non-discursive. Here, I am anticipating the problem for incongruent counterparts: how it is that we can recognize the difference between our two hands when the distinguishing representation is in their spatially oriented shape alone, something which cannot distinguished through discursive activity alone.

The unity in the intuition is first brought about in virtue of the representation of the object in space. This unity precedes any reference to the concept of the object, but at the same time is the unity of rule associated with that concept. We cognize the object through the concept of a triangle because that is the particular kind of unity it has, a unity that is first given in the mere appearance of the object.

What appears in intuition is the shape of the triangle: three straight lines composed thus. It happens that this unity is in accordance with the rule for how a triangle ought to be structured if

it is to be a representation of a triangle for me, and so it is in the corresponding concept that we think of this object as a triangle.

7. Positive Account of Intuitional Content

At this point I would like to bring what I have been arguing together in a positive account of intuitional content. Hanna claims that the representation of the spatial orientation of intuitional content is non-conceptual because this representation is not determined in accordance with a concept of space. I have argued that if this representation is non-conceptual it could not stand under the synthetic unity of apperception, through which alone a representation has any significance for me. I have shown that in corresponding with the unity of space, our spatially oriented intuition is unified in accordance with the concept of a magnitude, functioning as a rule for how a representation of an object in space ought to be structured if it is to be a representation of an object as in space. I then went on to show that the unity the intuition has in virtue of it being such an object, a determinate space, corresponds to the unity of rule associated with the concept of the object. This is the distinction between the unity of rule and the associated concept.

What appears in intuition in virtue of the form of appearance is the shape of a triangle. In the relation of this manifold to the unity of apperception in it we can thus realize this synthesis is also in accordance with a rule for how a representation ought to be structured if it is to be a representation of a triangle for me. The concept of a triangle consists in the consciousness of the unity of this synthesis, but the unity of this synthesis is brought about already at the level of appearance. My point here is that not only is an intuition not non-conceptual, it contains in it every concept entailed by the particular unity the intuition has.

In the picture I have been urging, it sounds at times as though the representation of the object as mere appearance is fundamental to the recognition of the object in the concept, but this is not what I mean. The unity of rule that determines every manifold at once determines it to be a representation of the object as in space and determines the representation to be of a triangle, or as Kant describes here, a line:

In order to cognize something in space, e.g. a line, I must draw it, and thus synthetically bring about a determinate combination of the given manifold, so that the unity of this action is at the same time the unity of consciousness (in the concept line), and thereby is an object (a determinate space) first cognized. (B138)

The synthesis of apprehension is in agreement with the synthesis of apperception through which we cognize the object as object or as appearance, but either way the unity in the intuition is one and the same and thus affords us to carve out, so to speak, any concept associated with the particular kind of unity the intuition has.

Throughout the *Critique* Kant mentions concepts of space. This is difficult for certain non-conceptualists like Allais to interpret.⁵ Surely by this Kant does not mean concepts of space in general, because space is singular and so we do not have a concept of it. By concept of space, Kant just means, the representation of a determinate space. We have this representation by placing limits on the infinite given magnitude that is space through cognizing an object as in space. The concept of space, as determinate space, consists in the particular unity the intuition has.

⁵ See Allais (2009) “Kant, Non-Conceptual Content, and the Representation of Space”

So, here I argue, in contrast with Hanna's reading of intuitional content, that not only is intuitional content not non-conceptual, it contains in it every concept entailed by the particular unity the intuition has.

8. Conclusion

In this paper I have argued Hanna's Kantian Non-conceptualism thesis that the existence and representational significance of non-conceptual content is founded in and supported by Kant's cognitive theory is untenable on the grounds that all representations, if they are to be representationally significant for me, must stand under the synthetic unity of apperception. The unity of apperception is the unity of rule in the representation. This means that concepts, function as a rule, have a necessary role in constituting the synthetic unity of apperception, through which alone a representation is possible.

Hanna asks the fundamental philosophical question: can we and do we sometimes cognitively encounter things directly and pre-discursively (non-conceptualism), or must we always cognitively encounter them only within the framework of discursive rationality (conceptualism)? Hanna reads Kant's intuitional content as non-conceptual because it accounts for our immediate relation to objects, meaning not mediated by concepts. However, here I argue that in intuition concepts function as rules, the pre-discursive counterpart to the way concepts figure in the articulated content of thought, or propositional content of judgment, to bring unity to the manifold of representation in intuition. This unity constitutes the transcendental unity of apperception, which is above all, the ground for any cognitive encounter with things in the world.

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